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11 Introduction
The size distribution of business ¯rms has proved to be one of the more endur-
ing objects of economic research as it re°ects the organization of production
in an economy. Naturally, it is one of the major concerns of economic analysis
whether production is organized e±ciently, be it within plants, ¯rms, or in-
dustries. Within an industry, that is among ¯rms producing the same output
good, presumably with access to the same technology, there is little theoretical
reason to expect a non-degenerate distribution of sizes in classical competitive
equilibrium theory. Empirical evidence, however, tends to con¯rm heteroge-
neous size distributions of ¯rms. A possible way of reconciliation is that ¯rms
di®er with respect to unobservable technological characteristics and ¯rm sizes
are chosen optimally in response to those characteristics. Yet judging from
observations it is far from obvious that all ¯rms are indeed e±ciently sized
(see e.g. Banerjee and Du°o, 2004).
Moreover, when e±cient organization of production given technology means
optimal factor input choice, this primarily delivers a theory of plant size as
put forward by Hart (1995). It is not obvious how technical e±ciency at plant
level might be connected to technical e±ciency at the ¯rm level. Integration
of technically e±cient plants might for instance result in undesirable market
concentration. That is, focussing on input-output analysis of production in
plants precludes a possibly interesting and relevant aspect of the ¯rm, namely
strategic considerations. Firm size may not only a®ect production but also
output markets or the distribution of pro¯ts among stakeholders, an issue this
paper will emphasize. Hence, in order to explain size distributions of ¯rms
it is desirable to employ a proper notion of the boundaries of a ¯rm. As a
consequence, this paper follows along the lines of property rights theory, ex-
plicitly modeling ownership rights on productive assets thereby allowing for a
well-de¯ned boundary of the ¯rm.
Departures from a degenerate ¯rm size distribution have also been ex-
plained by introducing market imperfections or missing markets. Often this
comes in conjunction with assumptions on technology that ensure market im-
perfections on one market a®ect another. In this paper markets are complete
and imperfections are assumed explicitly in that contracts within ¯rms are in-
complete, thus leading to renegotiations, and there is a spread between lending
and borrowing interest rate. There is an immediate application as these as-
sumptions can be expected to hold in developing countries, for instance due
2to enforcement problems. The production technology is assumed to be de-
terministic, to have strict complementarity between labor and capital, and a
well-de¯ned optimum at a certain ¯rm size such that average output is max-
imized. This has the virtue of providing a clear-cut e±ciency benchmark as
opposed to most of the literature where size choice is always constrained ef-
¯cient given a ¯rm's characteristics, for instance technology or wealth level,
and equilibrium prices. Complementarity of inputs to production is needed
primarily to ensure that at least one agent is indispensable. However, in this
model an agent always has the incentive to choose a technology that makes him
indispensable because incompleteness of labor contracts implies renegotiations
within ¯rms.
Agents in the model economy meet in a matching market deciding on
coalition membership, ownership rights on assets and debt or deposit and
are allowed to make instantaneous side payments. Then agents engage in
productive activities in their coalitions. Due to the incompleteness of con-
tracts, output shares of agents are determined by renegotiation, consistent
with intra-¯rm bargaining in Stole and Zwiebel (1996). Agents' payo®s then
depend positively on their ownership rights on assets.
The equilibrium ¯rm size distribution turns out to be heterogenous and
is capable of simultaneously allowing for ¯rms both too small and too large
compared to the ¯rm size that maximizes average output. For this both intra-
¯rm bargaining and imperfect capital markets are needed. Inequality in initial
endowments among agents and capital market imperfections induce a wedge
in the cost of capital between agents of di®erent wealth levels. Subsequently,
poorer agents choose less investment in assets than rich agents do. The bar-
gaining induces owners of ¯rms to employ more agents than technically ef-
¯cient as their share of joint pro¯t increases with the number of employees
and assets owned. Hence, the desired ¯rm size by a ¯rm owner exceeds the
e±cient one, but wealth-constrained owners choose smaller sizes. In addition,
the model generates a relation between wealth and income inequality remi-
niscent of the dual economy. Whereas wealth inequality between workers and
owners exceeds income inequality, income inequality exceeds wealth inequality
between ¯rm members and unmatched agents. As the measure of unmatched
agents negatively depends on capital stock the model is able to incorporate a
non-monotonic relationship between inequality and growth.
In equilibrium, the ¯rm size distribution tends to be bimodal whenever
3market imperfections and endowment inequality are su±ciently severe and
the endowment distribution has a Paretian tail. This is consistent with empir-
ical ¯ndings as bimodal size distributions appear to be typical for developing
countries (e. g. the survey by Tybout, 2000), countries generally deemed to
be prone to market imperfections and high wealth inequality. In contrast,
size distributions of ¯rms in developed countries are commonly found to be
unimodal (see Cabral and Mata, 2003). A number of empirical studies (e. g.
Little et al., 1988; Biggs et al., 1995; Hallward-Driemeier et al., 2002) provide
some evidence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between e±ciency and size
of ¯rms in terms of output per worker in countries with bimodal ¯rm size dis-
tributions, indicating that the presence of both too large and too small ¯rms is
indeed common. This suggests that the model is capable of providing a viable
framework for policy analysis in developing countries.
The literature on size distributions of ¯rms is abundant, yet tends to focus
on input-output analysis. A research agenda can be traced back at least
to Simon and Bonini (1958). Lucas (1978) introduces a general equilibrium
model with agents heterogenous with respect to productivity. Firms sizes are
chosen optimally based on complementarity of agents' productivity type with
input factors. In equilibrium, ¯rms always have a technically e±cient size and
the size distribution depends on the distribution of types. In Kihlstrom and
La®ont (1979) agents di®er in their aversion to risk. In a general equilibrium
model without insurance markets less risk averse agents become entrepreneurs
employing more risk averse agents. Labor demand increases and equilibrium
¯rm size decreases in the entrepreneur's risk aversion such that ¯rms tend to
be too small in equilibrium compared to the ¯rst best. The size distribution
of ¯rms then depends on the distribution of risk aversion among agents.
Another strand of the literature concerned with ¯rm size heterogeneity is
on entry and exit of ¯rms. Among other notable contributions are the selection
models in Jovanovic (1982) and Hopenhayn (1992). They introduce dynamic
partial equilibrium models of ¯rms that are subject to productivity shocks
and decide on market entry or exit based on the properties of the stochastic
process governing productivity shocks. Firm sizes are always e±cient given
their productivity state and the size distribution depends exclusively on the
properties of the productivity shocks.
These contribution share a neo-classical view of the ¯rm as a black box
combining input factors to produce output. More recent contributions tend
4to move away from this standpoint, as for instance, Caballero and Hammour
(1996). They assume speci¯city of factors to production and include bargain-
ing over joint pro¯ts in their analysis. This leads to a better bargaining posi-
tion and a higher pro¯t share of the factor that is less speci¯c in the sense that
it may be more easily employed elsewhere. Consequently, they ¯nd overem-
ployment in equilibrium when labor is less mobile than capital and thus the
equilibrium wage rate is below its ¯rst best level. However, given equilibrium
prices, ¯rms choose their factor inputs e±ciently. Another approach, by Coo-
ley et al. (2004), is to model ¯nancial constraints on ¯rms' investments which
results in undersized ¯rms compared to the average output maximizing ¯rm
size. In a general equilibrium model where contracting constraints prevent
e±cient lending and ¯rms di®er in wealth, poorer ¯rms are undercapitalized.
Given a Leontief production technology demand for labor is below its ¯rst
best level and so are the wages. If there are ¯rms su±ciently rich not to be
¯nancially constrained, these choose a size above its ¯rst best level. Yet, given
the equilibrium wage rate, these ¯rms are e±ciently sized. However, with the
possible exception of Caballero and Hammour (1996), the mentioned contri-
butions share a potential de¯ciency in that it is not straightforward whether
they are on plant or ¯rm sizes.
Methodologically this paper is related to Legros and Newman (2004b),
who ¯nd too large ¯rms in a matching model between technologically com-
plementary ¯rms using an incomplete contracting framework. In their model
monetary side payments between coalition members are limited by liquidity
constraints, but agents can be compensated by changing the organizational
structure. This may lead to integration although this type of ownership in
their model is ine±cient in a well-de¯ned sense. In a partial setting close
to Hart and Moore (1990), Bolton and Whinston (1993) ¯nd a similar over-
integration result.
This paper will proceed by introducing the theoretical model in section 2.
Section 3 gives an equilibrium existence result, and section 4 identi¯es some
properties of the matching equilibrium with respect to the endowment distri-
bution. In section 5 we identify circumstances leading to a bimodal ¯rm size
distribution and discuss applications of the model. Section 6 concludes with
a discussion while the more cumbersome proofs are con¯ned to the appendix.
52 The Model
2.1 Agents
There is a single-good economy populated by a continuum of agents I ´ [0;1].
The single good can be used both for consumption and investment. Agents
are heterogenous in their initial endowments of the good which is given by
the one to one mapping ! : I ! [!;!], ! < !, assumed to be continuously
di®erentiable. The function !(i) is then the inverse of the atom-less wealth
distribution function in the model economy. All agents are endowed with the
same amount of human capital h, so hi = h for all i 2 I. We assume that
an agent's human capital becomes speci¯c to the task that it is employed in.1
Agent i's utility function ui(ci) is linear in consumption of the single good ci
which is given by ¯nal payo®s and assumed to be ui = ci.
2.2 Assets
In the economy there exist two types of assets, AI and AII. These assets are
complementary in the sense that combined output exceeds the sum of individ-
ual output and one asset without the other is useless. Imagine these assets to
be a factory building and a machine, for instance. Thus, under our assump-
tions a factory cannot produce without a machine and vice versa. The produc-
tion technology incorporated in the assets is denoted by f(A;hn) where the set
A denotes the assets used in production and hn = (h0;h1;:::;hn) a vector of
human capital. We follow the convention of writing An = fAI;AII
1 ;:::;AII
n g.
Assumptions on the technology are
Assumption 1 (Production technology) Let hn denote a (1£n+1) vector of
hs.
(i) f(;;h0) = f(fAIg;h0) = f(fAIIg;h0) = 0.
(ii) f(An;hn) ¡ f(An¡1;hn¡1) > f(An+1;hn+1) ¡ f(An;hn) ¸ 0 8n > 1.
(iii) limn!1(f(An;hn) ¡ f(An¡1;hn¡1)) = 0.
(iv) 1
n+1f(An;hn) < 1
K+1f(AK;hK) 8n 6= K.
1While this assumption appears to be not entirely innocuous, it has the virtue that outside
options in the equilibrium of the renegotiation game do not depend on equilibrium pro¯ts
in coalitions. An alternative assumption is that the matching process involves frictions, for
instance in the form of costs associated with switching coalitions.
6(v) f(An;hn) = f(An;hn+1) = f(An+1;hn) 8n ¸ 1.
(vi) Investment cost of an asset is c regardless of the type.
As this model is concerned with the output from human capital only we as-
sume for convenience that production cost is zero. Thus we limit our attention
to additional output achievable by the strict complementarity of human and
physical capital.2 Assumption (i) gives the output of an agent who is not
member of a coalition which is normalized to zero thus giving the agents' out-
side option. By Assumption (ii) the production technology has diminishing
returns to scale and Assumption (iii) will guarantee a ¯nite bound on coalition
sizes. Assumption (vi) ensures that there is a ¯rm size K that is e±cient in
the sense that it maximizes average surplus. Note that it is implied by (ii)
and (iii). Assumption (v) states that human capital and assets are strict com-
plements, so that a factory and a machine need an operator each to produce
output. By Assumption (vi) setting up an asset involves the investment of c
units of the good regardless of the asset type. This assumption is made to
avoid that exogenous asset cost asymmetries drive the results of the analysis.
Wherever the level of human capital is constant across agent we will drop it
as an argument to the production function and write f(An) for f(An;hn).
2.3 Coalitions and Ownership Structures
All agents i 2 I may form ¯nite coalitions to jointly produce output. Coalitions
or teams of agents are assumed to be of ¯nite size to capture the notion of
small units in a large economy. Within a team of agents each team member
matters, but the impact of a team on the whole economy is negligible. Let
F(I) denote the set of ¯nite subsets of I. A coalition will be denoted by
N 2 F(I) consisting of n + 1 = jNj members. M will denote the member of
coalition N owning AI. We will call M the owner and the remaining agents
the workers, although this proves to be appropriate only for coalitions with
n > 1 workers.3 The distribution of ownership rights on assets in a set of
agents L 2 F(I) with L µ NL for some coalition NL, is captured by µ(L)
giving the assets of one or more agents M:
2Note that this interpretation is also consistent with the costly acquisition of speci¯c
human capital provided the acquisition cost is constant across agents.
3In the course of this paper we will refer to a coalition N by the number of its workers,
n, and use the term n ¯rm as a synonym.
7De¯nition 1 De¯ne µ(L) to be the mapping µ : F(I) ! fAI;AII;;gR, as-
signing a set of agents to their assets.
To familiarize the reader with the concept, note that e.g. fAIg µ µ(M) by
convention. We follow the convention of referring to a coalition that is a
singleton by simply writing the identity of the agent. The combination of a
coalition and the allocation of ownership rights within that coalition (N;µ) is
called a ¯rm. At this point we limit our analysis for simplicity to a limited set
of admissible ownership structures:
Assumption 2 For all coalitions N, jµ(i)j = 0 8 i 6= M 2 N, i.e. no worker
holds any assets and µ(i) 6= µ(j) for jµ(i)j;jµ(j)j > 0 and i;j 2 N.
This assumption excludes ownership structures that assign joint ownership
of assets and those that allow workers to hold assets.4 A discussion on this
assumption is postponed to section 6 where we also present an example where
Assumption 2 does not hold. However, it is best motivated by putting more
structure on the technology incorporated in the assets. Suppose for instance
that asset type AI represents a non-physical asset as for instance trust in the
¯rm embodied in its physical presence, while asset type AII represents the
size of the productive asset. This way, the holder of asset AII must at the
same time hold AI. This could describe the setup of a shop where the store
building itself represents the ¯rm as perceived by customers and suppliers.
Indeed, Chowdhury (1994) provides a case study of small grocers in Dhaka,
Bangladesh, that appears to be consistent with our assumptions. A grocery
store typically consists of an owner-manager assisted by employees where the
owner-manager owns both the building and the stock. The physical size of
the shop determines the number of assistants. Interviewed entrepreneurs em-
phasize the need for visibility in order to obtain trade credit. Almost all case
studies in the same survey ¯nd also that owners place huge importance on
personal trust between their ¯rm and both suppliers and customers.
Another case study in the same survey, on women entrepreneurs in the tex-
tile industry (Zohir, 1994), ¯nds a similar pattern. The typical ¯rm consists of
one cutting master who provides design and supervision and several operators
of sewing machines. Interestingly, assets, i.e. the sewing machines, are usually
owned by the cutting master. Asset AI would represent the human capital for
4It is possible to relax the assumption to allow workers to own one asset A
II without
changing the analysis.
8designing clothes and asset AII a sewing machine. Strikingly, a common fea-
ture among small ¯rms in di®erent industries is that initial capital investment
is to a large extent ¯nanced by equity with typical debt-equity ratios of 0:25.
Only after setting up ¯rms begin to regularly use trade credit for ¯nancing
working capital.
2.4 Sequence of Events
The timing of events in the model economy is given as follows.
1) Matching market takes place, agents simultaneously decide on coalitions,
investment plans, and their capital market position.
2) Production takes place and ¯rm members may renegotiate the distribu-
tion of pro¯ts at any time.
3) Payo®s take place.
2.5 Contractual Environment and Renegotiations
The exposition proceeds backwards in time starting with intra¯rm renego-
tiations. We assume that labor contracts can be renegotiated at any time.
One possible foundation for this assumption lies in the non-contractability of
claims to future output whereas contracts that determine ownership rights on
assets and instantaneous side payments in the course of coalition formation
are feasible in this economy.
A reason for the lack of contracts conditioning on output may reside in the
legal institutions of an economy and the nature of output. It seems reasonable
that at one time or another in the course of production any team member has
the opportunity to hide units of output or pro¯ts due to its liquid nature.5 In
contrast to this, assets are viewed as machinery or buildings and are somewhat
more protected from adverse behavior. Thus output may not be veri¯able
especially in small and medium businesses lacking a sophisticated accounting
scheme. Moreover, even if output is veri¯able, in order to enforce the contract
5This points to another motivation for our assumptions. Suppose for instance that team
members' actions are not observable and the amount of output units that can be diverted
depends on the individual's access to output. Access in turn is likely to depend on individual
ownership rights. A Nash bargaining solution model where threat points are determined by
the amount of output agents can secure themselves in case renegotiations break down yields
similar conclusions.
9a court will be needed. It will then depend on the ability of this court to reveal
the true circumstances within a given team whether a certain sharing rule is
contractible or not. Non-binding labor contracts can be caused by weak legal
institutions as well.
An alternative set of assumptions also giving rise to renegotiations is that
labor contracts are non-binding and contracts on future output only possible
within coalitions. This means that contracts on coalitions cannot be written
in the matching market. However, agents may decide in the matching market
to become speci¯c to each other. This describes an economy where written
labor contracts and worker protection laws are not frequent. This appears to
hold for less developed countries, and even in some developed countries their
e®ectiveness is not beyond doubt. Outsiders' inability to write contracts on
future output may be explained by an asymmetric information setting where
¯rm members' actions are observable only within ¯rms.
Whenever contracts are incomplete in one of these senses renegotiations
will determine individual shares of joint pro¯t. Fortunately, the literature
on renegotiations with property rights is abundant and provides some more
robust results. Let ¼i(n;µ) denote the payo® of agent i in team N of size
n + 1 given an allocation of ownership rights µ. The arguments capture joint
output ¦(n) = f(An) and agent i's relative bargaining power based on the
importance of his assets to the team. Formally, we assume
Assumption 3 Individual payo®s from renegotiations within the team have
the following properties provided individual outside options are worse for all
team members.6
(i) Asset ownership increases the individual pro¯t share:
¼i(n;µ) ¸ ¼i(n;µ0) for jµ(i)j > jµ0(i)j with strict inequality for jµ(i)j > 1.
(ii) Pro¯ts are split equally in symmetric teams: ¼i(1;µ) = ¼j(1;µ) 8 µ:




¦(n¡1) 8 n if µ(i) ¾ AI.
Assumption 3.(ii) is straightforward as within symmetric ¯rms both agents
are indispensable for production. Parts (i)7 and (iii) are central results from
6It is straightforward that in a matching equilibrium this must hold by stability.
7Part (i) is super°uous under centralized ownership as assumed in Assumption A2. How-
ever, at a later stage of the paper, Assumption A2 will be relaxed as suggested in footnote 4.
10most of the literature on bargaining under the possibility of exclusion and
compatible with production that has diminishing returns to team size.
Notably our set of assumptions is consistent with a number of extensive-
form bargaining games, in particular with those yielding the Shapley value
as an outcome. For instance, Hart and Moore (1990) use this concept for
modeling renegotiations with the result that holding property rights increases
an agent's share of joint pro¯t.8 Intuitively, this is due to possibility to use the
right to withdraw assets from production as a threat. Obviously, if one agent's
pro¯t shares increases in the number of assets then the share of some other
agents must decrease. The fact that the Shapley value of an indispensable
agent increases in the number of substitutable co-workers can be checked by
calculations as in Rajan and Zingales (1998).
Another prominent example is the non-cooperative bargaining game pro-
posed by Stole and Zwiebel (1996). They analyze renegotiations within a ¯rm
such that an indispensable agent bargains bilaterally with the remainder of
the team. The bargaining game used is that of Binmore et al. (1986). In a
generalized version they ¯nd that individual pro¯ts are given by the Shapley
value and not less than the individual outside option, that is an agent's max-
imum pro¯t obtained outside the team. That intra-¯rm bargaining allowing
for property rights on assets is indeed consistent with the assumptions can
be concluded from Propositions 1-3 in Gall (2004). Even when allowing for
minor alterations in the extensive form, as in Westermark (2003), Assumption
3 continues to be consistent with this bargaining game.
2.6 The Matching Stage
In the matching stage a matching market takes place. This means that indi-
viduals decide simultaneously on their investment in assets, on the coalition
they will take part in, and their activity on the capital market. When choosing
a course of action, agents treat the interest rate as exogenous. In the econ-
Note that then strict equality in (i) for jµ(i)j = 1 implies that workers holding one A
II have
the same renegotiation payo® as workers holding no assets. This in turn implies that both
roles are equivalent in this model up to an interpretation of the side payments, i.e. whether
they include investment cost for asset-less workers or not for asset-owning workers.
8Interestingly, de Meza and Lockwood (1998) ¯nd that the indication for the property
rights allocation is not robust to minor alterations in the extensive form of the underlying
bargaining game. The ¯nding that agents' pro¯t shares are non-decreasing in asset ownership
carries over nevertheless.
11omy the interest rate is determined endogenously by credit market clearing
asset investment plans. At the matching stage agents know their continuation
payo®s from the subsequent stage of being member in some coalition N with
an allocation of property rights µ and holding ownership rights on assets µ(i).
This continuation pro¯t is given by the individual payo®s from renegotiations,
¼i(n;µ).
Let the individual valuation function vi(n;µ;!(i);r) denote this contin-
uation payo® from being in coalition N net of capital investment costs and
interest rate payments depending on the number of workers in a coalition n,
asset ownership µ, individual endowments !(i) and interest rate r:
vi(n;µ;!(i);r) = ¼i(n;µ)+(1+r)(!(i)¡jµ(i)jc) if !(i)¸jµ(i)jc
vi(n;µ;!(i);r) = ¼i(n;µ)+(1+i)(!(i)¡jµ(i)jc) if !(i)<jµ(i)jc:
Feasible allocations of ownership rights µ associated to any coalition N can
be restricted to require agents to be able to repay their debts and technical
e±ciency. The set of feasible allocations of ownership rights on assets in a
coalition N, £(N), is then given by





That means that only allocations that are consistent with Assumption A2,
that employ the proper number of assets, and whose members are able to pay
back their debt are considered feasible except for singletons where only the
empty set, i.e. owning no asset and receiving the outside option, is deemed
feasible.
2.7 Preferences over Ownership and Firm Size
We ¯rst determine some properties of the optimal individual asset ownership
µ(i) depending on the interest rate r and the coalition N individual i is member
of. Let ¼1 ´
f(A1;h1)
2 abbreviate average pro¯t in a symmetric n = 1 ¯rm
which is equal to the renegotiation game payo® for a n = 1 ¯rm member
given Assumption 3. The following lemma states some properties of agents'
preference orderings over ownership rights.
12Lemma 1 Agents' preferences over individual ownership rights are well-de¯ned
and monotone in the interest rate and wealth:
(i) For any two pairs of ownership rights and coalition size there is at most
one interest rate r0, such that an agent with !(i) is indi®erent at r0,
prefers the pair involving more asset ownership at r < r0, and prefers
the other one at r > r0.
(ii) For any two pairs of ownership rights and coalition size there is at most
one endowment level !0, such that an agent endowed with !0 is indif-
ferent, an agent with !(i) > !0 prefers the pair involving more asset
ownership, and an agent with !(i) < !0 prefers the other one. More-
over, !0 is non-decreasing in the interest rate r.
Proof: In Appendix.
This means that agents' bilateral preference orderings on asset ownership
may switch exactly once both in the interest rate and in initial endowments.
Moreover, a monotonicity result holds: more assets are preferred as the indi-
vidual cost for capital decreases, namely whenever the interest rate decreases
or wealth increases. It is possible to show that indeed for all agents µ(i) = ; is
strictly preferred to µ0(i) = fAIIg in coalitions with jNj > 1 and side payments
from workers to owners jt(i) ¡ t0(i)j < c.
In order to determine an upper bound on ¯rm size we look at asymmetric
¯rms with n > 1 where members obtain payo®s from either owning nothing,
that is µ(i) = ; which is given by
vi(n;µ;!(i);r) = ¼i(n;µ) + (1 + r)!(i);
or from owning everything, with µ(i) = An, which amounts to
vi(n;µ;!(i);r) = ¼i(n;µ) + (1 + r)(!(i) ¡ (n + 1)c):
It is not necessary to include side payments in these equations as we are
interested in the optimal ¯rm size an owner with unlimited resources would
choose and side payments must be less than c. Clearly, the workers' payo®s
are decreasing in n, net of side payments, whereas a su±ciently rich owner's
payo® increases in n as long as
vi(n+1;µn+1;!(i);r) ¡ vi(n;µn;!(i);r) > 0
, ¼i(n + 1;µn+1) ¡ ¼i(n;µn) > (1+r)c; (1)
13where µn(i) = An. This inequality implies there exists a cuto® ¯rm size n so
that further increasing ¯rm size leads to a decrease in the owner's payo® even
for an owner who has su±cient endowments not to need to borrow. Indepen-
dently of the owner's asset AII holdings, marginal pro¯t from increasing ¯rm
size by one must outweigh the cost for an additional asset. Furthermore, this
cuto® ¯rm size must be ¯nite because of the assumptions on the production
function. Therefore ¹ n provides a general ¯nite upper bound on ¯rm sizes. To
make things interesting we limit our analysis to the case where investment
costs are su±ciently small so that at least for an agent who is not credit
constrained it pays to choose a ¯rm size n > K at r = 0, that is
Assumption 4 (su±ciently small investment cost)
9n > K : ¼i(n;µn) > ¼i(n¡1;µn¡1) + c > ¼1 + nc:
where µn(i) = An. Moreover, ¼i(n+1;µ0) < ¼i(n;µ0) for all n ¸ 1 and µ(i) = ;.
This assumption holds whenever pro¯ts from renegotiation are increasing suf-
¯ciently in ¯rm size despite diminishing returns to scale compared to asset
investment cost. As M's renegotiation payo® increases in ¯rm size the maxi-
mal ¯rm size to expect is determined by (1) and by equilibrium side payments.
Let us collect the results on preferred ¯rm sizes in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Preferences over ¯rm size have the following properties:
(i) For n > 1, vi(n;µ(i) = ;;!(i);r) is strictly decreasing in n and
(ii) any ¯rm size n > n 2 N cannot result from pro¯t-maximizing behavior.
Let us represent Lemmata 1 and 2 by Figure 1. It is possible to partition
the endowment space into a ¯nite number of subsets so that all endowment
levels in each subset induce the same preference ordering. The support of the
endowment distribution is on the vertical axis and the interest rate on the
horizontal axis with the thin lines representing multiples of investment cost
c. The bold lines correspond to cuto® values for endowments given r, so that
the labeled areas denote the intervals of endowments at a given interest rate
for which the labeled action is optimal. For workers the bold lines represent
indi®erence between owning one asset in a symmetric n = 1 ¯rm and working
in some n > 1 ¯rm. The support of the endowment distribution is on the






















Figure 1: Ownership preferences depending on endowments and interest rate
representing multiples of investment cost c. This describes a class society of
agents as found in the work by Evans and Jovanovic (1989) and Banerjee and
Newman (1993).
2.8 Side Payments
Let t(i;N) denote individual i's side payment in coalition N. We allow only
for balanced side payments within a coalition, that is
P
i2N t(i;N) = 0 for all
coalitions N.9 Side payments are subject to the capital market imperfection as
well. This introduces a crucial non-transferability of utility into the matching
model that will prevent the allocation from generally maximizing aggregate
utility. Then the individual valuation function vi(:) from being member of
¯rm (N;µ) incorporating individual side payments t(i;N) can be written as
vi(n;µ;!(i);r;t(i;N)) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
¼i(n;µ) + (1 + r)(!(i) + t(i;N) ¡ jµ(i)jc)
if !(i) ¸ jµ(i)jc + t(i;N)
¼i(n;µ) + (1 + r)°(!(i) + t(i;N) ¡ jµ(i)jc)
if !(i) < jµ(i)jc + t(i;N):
(2)
To put this into context with ¯gure 1, note that side payments may shift
upwards or downwards the curves indicating indi®erence between di®erent
9We follow the convention of interpreting t(:) as the payments from workers to owners
which may be negative, of course.
15investment plans.
2.9 Capital Market
Investment in assets may be ¯nanced by individual endowments or by loans
taken on the capital market. Endowments not used for assets may be lent
on the capital market. The capital market is assumed to be imperfect such
that there is an interest rate spread between lending interest rate 1 + r and
borrowing interest rate 1 + i ´ (1 + r)°, ° > 1.10 The lending interest rate
is endogenously de¯ned by market clearing. We assume there exists a costless
storage technology providing a rate of return of 0 which will provide a lower
bound for the equilibrium interest rate.





Agent i's preferred ownership choice µ(i) depends on r and thus excess demand
for loans does so, too. However, preferred ownership choices also depend on
the side payments. Side payments are balanced within coalitions, so they do
not enter excess demand. Due to feasibility of ownership right allocations for
all n > 0 coalitions investment plans involve exactly n + 1 assets. Whenever
aggregate endowments are scarce the equilibrium interest rate is determined by
inducing a su±ciently large measure of agents to weakly prefer their outside
option to any role in any equilibrium ¯rm. In addition, these agents have
to prefer their outside option to anything they could possibly get in any non-
equilibrium ¯rm at side payments that induce any agent to own this particular
¯rm.
To illustrate this let us look more closely at a symmetric ¯rm and suppose
side payments are 0 for the moment. For an agent with endowments !(i) < c
not to prefer to join a symmetric ¯rm it must hold that
(1 + r¤)!(i) ¸ ¼2 + (1 + r¤)°(!(i) ¡ c):
De¯ne the endowment level such that an individual is indi®erent between the








10This is a simple and straightforward way to model imperfect credit markets that has
frequently been used in the literature. It may be generated by the presence of moral hazard
on the borrower's side, see for instance Galor and Zeira (1993) for a similar setup.
16Using Lemma 1 and continuity of !(i) the measure of agents preferring their
outside option to the symmetric ¯rm, ¹U, is given by
^ ¹ = ¹(i 2 I : !(i) · ^ !);
which is continuous and strictly increasing in r on (!;c). Returning to the
general case let w =
R
I !(i)di denote aggregate endowments. De¯ne the cuto®
endowment level omega U such that the measure of agents poorer than !U
equals the di®erence between the capital stock necessary to provide every agent
with an asset and aggregate endowments implicitly by
¹(!(i) · !U) = maxfc ¡ w;0g:
Finally, let ^ t(n) denote the side payment that makes the richest unmatched
agent with wealth !U exactly indi®erent between the outside option and work-




> > > > <
> > > > :
^ ¹(r) ¸ c ¡ w; and
(1+r)!(i) ¸ vi(n;;;!(i);r;t¤) 8n : ¹n > 0;!(i) · !U; and
8n0·n s.t. ¹n0 =0 9 n s.t. ¹n>0 :
vi(n;An;!;r;t¤)¸vi(n0;An0;!;r;^ t(n0))
(4)
with at least one expression holding with equality. That is, agents with en-
dowments less than !U must prefer their outside option to being member of
a symmetric ¯rm, to working in an equilibrium ¯rm at equilibrium side pay-
ments, and to bribe the richest agent in the economy into a non-equilibrium
¯rm. Otherwise the equilibrium interest rate is zero because of the costless
storage technology. Formally, the equilibrium interest rate is given by
r¤ =
(
^ r s.t. (4) if w < c
0 if w ¸ c:
(5)
2.10 Equilibrium Concept
Formally, a non-transferable utility matching equilibrium with limited side
payments similar to Legros and Newman (2004a) and Legros and Newman
(1996) is de¯ned as follows
De¯nition 2 A matching equilibrium with limited side payments denoted by
(P¤;µ¤;r¤;t¤) is a measure consistent partition P¤ of the agent space, a map-
ping µ¤ of individuals to their assets, an interest rate r¤ and transfers t¤ such
that
17² condition (5) holds (credit market clearing),
² for all Pi 2 P¤ it holds that
P
j2Pi t¤
j = 0 for all i 2 I (within coalition
transfers),
² @P0





i) 8 i 2 P0
i, i 2 P¤
i and





j = 0 (stability).
Measure consistency intuitively requires that the measure of ¯rst members
of any coalition must equate the measure of the second members which must
equate the measure of third members etc.11 This equilibrium concept pos-
tulates that there exists no blocking coalition which is feasible with respect
to the distribution of ownership rights and aggregate endowments and makes
every member strictly better o® using side payments. It coincides with the
f-core with limited side payments (see Kaneko and Wooders, 1996).
2.11 Feasibility and Labor Demand
Stability and measure consistency of a matching equilibrium translate into a
condition equating supply and demand for labor for each ¯rm size. That is,
given equilibrium payo®s for each ¯rm size n the measure of agents weakly
preferring to be owners of such ¯rms must equate n times the measure of
agents weakly preferring to be workers in such ¯rms. Let us ¯rst de¯ne the
measures ¹nM by
¹nM = ¹(fi : vi(n;µ;!(i);r;t(i)) ¸ vi(n0;µ0;!(i);r;t0(i)) ;
8 (n0;µ0)6=(n;µ)g); (6)
and ¹nW by
¹nW = ¹(fj : !(i) ¸ !U;vj(n;µ;!(j);r;t(j)) ¸ vj(n0;µ0;!(j);r;t0(j)) ;
8 (n0;µ0)6=(n;µ)g): (7)
Monetary side payments t(:), t0(:) are those associated to the respective coali-
tion and ownership rights combination with positive measure in equilibrium.12
11The reader is referred to Kaneko and Wooders (1986) for the formal de¯nition and
extensive discussion.
12Strictly speaking, side payments in ¯rm types of measure zero in equilibrium need not
be de¯ned. However, due to monotonicity found in Lemma 1 and the fact that ¯rms consist
18These expressions give the measures ¹nM and ¹nW of all agents weakly prefer-
ring to be owners of n ¯rms to all other ownership rights and other ¯rm sizes,
and, respectively, to be workers in an n ¯rm.
Let ¹n denote the measure of n ¯rms in equilibrium. Feasibility requires
aggregate investment demand to equate aggregate endowments whenever the
latter are not abundant
n(r¤) X
n=1
(n + 1)¹nc · w: (8)
In equilibrium for all ¯rm sizes n > 0 it must hold that
¹n · ¹nM and n¹n · ¹nW: (9)
This means that in this model side payments are used to equate labor supply
and demand for any ¯rm size thus functioning similar to market prices in
general equilibrium models. It is noteworthy though, that in equilibrium a
positive measure of agents typically will be indi®erent between activity in
several labor markets.
2.12 First Best Benchmark
Concluding this section, we will provide an e±ciency benchmark in order to
enable comparison with later results. In a ¯rst best world where everything
is veri¯able coalition size should be expected to maximize the marginal in-
crease in net output of an additional worker subject to e±cient human capital
investments. This is { given the assumption on the production function {
equivalent to maximizing average output per coalition member. Hence, in a
¯rst best world coalition size would be equal to K throughout the economy
provided su±cient aggregate endowments.
3 Existence
As a ¯rst step let us sum up some important preliminaries that will hold for
any equilibrium.
only of workers and owners, if there exist side payments t(n) for a ¯rm size n such that
¹nM = ¹nW = 0, then this ¯rm size must have measure zero, ie. there exist no side
payments making both workers and owners in n ¯rms better o® than some other ¯rm size
with positive measure given equilibrium side payments. Therefore we can assign these side
payments t(n) to ¯rm types of measure zero as shadow prices which will be quite useful when
simulating.
19Lemma 3 Monetary side payments workers pay to owners within ¯rms de-
pend only on the size of the ¯rm and decrease in ¯rm size for all ¯rm sizes
that have positive measure in equilibrium. If aggregate endowments are scarce,
side payments are positive for all ¯rm sizes.
Proof: In Appendix.
The ¯nding that side payments depend only on ¯rm sizes means that side
payments function in fact like market wages for labor in a ¯rm of certain size
and do not depend on individual wealth. That bigger ¯rms pay higher wages
seems to be consistent with much of the empirical ¯ndings, yet some caution
is appropriate. Side payments only constitute part of a worker's payo®, in
addition they receive the payo® from intra-¯rm renegotiations of the joint
pro¯t.
Moreover, Lemma 3 implies that in equilibrium at least for scarce aggregate
endowments the poorest agents match into the largest ¯rms requiring the
smallest investment in form of side payments. On the other hand, richer
agents match into ¯rms that require more investment, that is into ¯rms with
more assets, as can be veri¯ed by comparing investment costs for an n and an
n + 1 ¯rm and using Lemma 3 and the fact that di®erences in workers' side
payments can never be higher than the cost of an asset. Hence, matching is
negative assortative.
Now let us verify that the matching equilibrium indeed exists and induces
a unique distribution of ¯rm sizes. The full proof is somewhat involved and
therefore re¯ned to the appendix but a sketch of it can be given here. First
we show that there exists an r¤ not dependent on side payments that induces
credit market clearing. Given r¤, existence of a matching equilibrium follows
using a well known result by Kaneko and Wooders (1996). Then we estab-
lish uniqueness of equilibrium payo®s which follows almost by de¯nition of
the equilibrium. Finally, it is shown by contradiction that uniqueness of pay-
o®s pins down coalition size and allocation of ownership rights in almost all
coalitions.
Proposition 1 A matching equilibrium with limited side payments exists and
induces a unique distribution of ¯rm sizes.
Proof: In Appendix.
20To illustrate the matching equilibrium a brief informal discussion of two
polar examples follows. Consider ¯rst an example with perfect equality in the
economy. Assume there is an almost degenerate distribution of endowments
so that !(i) = c and that K = 1.13 This means any agent has su±cient
endowments to prefer owning assets to not owning any and being a worker in
a large ¯rm. It follows immediately that the model economy will be populated
entirely by small, e±cient ¯rms: there will emerge only n = 1 coalitions with
symmetric asset ownership. This can be interpreted as an economy consisting
exclusively of self-employed individuals collaborating via markets.
The second example focuses on an extreme case of endowment inequal-
ity and severe credit market imperfections. Let there be a large measure of
endowment-less individuals, and a comparatively small measure of rich indi-
viduals owning all the endowments in the economy. This is not covered by
the assumption of continuous di®erentiability of !(i), however, an equilibrium
may exist nevertheless. To be more concrete, assume that the measure of poor
individuals exceeds the one of the super-rich more than twofold. Then there
will emerge only large ¯rms in the economy and all assets are owned by rich
agents, and all poor individuals are workers.
4 Firm Size and Endowment Distribution
Having established that a matching equilibrium indeed exists in our model and
induces a unique distribution of ¯rm sizes, we are interested in its properties.
The examples at the end of the last section only describe polar cases of wealth
distributions. In this section we will therefore examine the properties of the
matching equilibrium more generally.
Key to the matching equilibrium analysis is that all agents can secure
themselves at least the payo® from being member of a symmetric ¯rm, that is
vi(1;µ;!(i);r) where jµ(i)j = 1, or the outside option 0, whichever is higher.
This is because all agents have the opportunity to choose symmetric n = 1
coalitions and do not need agents from other endowment classes to form their
desired coalition. This means there are only agents willing to be workers if the
poorest agent has su±ciently bad outside options, that is the cost of capital for
the poorest agent is su±ciently high. Equally, there will only be owners if the
13In this case side payments are zero. However, for K > 1 the e±ciency result carries over
only if K ¯rms are su±ciently e±cient compared to other ¯rm sizes.
21richest agent has su±ciently bad outside options, that is the cost of capital for
the richest agent is su±ciently low. Moreover, poor agents having high cost of
capital choose low investment occupations whereas rich agents facing low cost
of capital choose high investment occupations. This means large ¯rms will
only emerge in equilibrium if there is su±cient heterogeneity in the agents'
cost of capital, i. e. there is su±cient endowment inequality.
4.1 Properties of the Matching Equilibrium
This subsection is concerned with some preliminary properties of the matching
equilibrium, especially with equilibrium side payments. These largely deter-
mine the size distribution of ¯rms and thus whether a variety of large ¯rms
emerges in equilibrium, and if so under what circumstances. As the endow-
ment distribution becomes more equal and agents' bargaining positions be-
come more equal the ¯rm size distribution may converge to a point measure
at the e±cient size K. However, this may happen only if the capital market
imperfections are not too severe. If this is not the case the ¯rm size distribu-
tion converges to a point measure at the minimal size n = 1. For instance,
with perfect credit markets transferability of utility between coalition members
is perfect. Then, of course, the f-core converges to coalitions that maximize
average output, namely of size K. Intuitively, as the endowment distribu-
tion becomes more equal, coalition members not owning assets are richer and
therefore less dependent on the ine±cient capital market when transferring
utility. The following proposition subsumes some interesting properties of the
equilibrium allocation.
Proposition 2 Properties of the matching equilibrium allocation
(i) When capital is scarce, a necessary condition for only e±cient ¯rms
to emerge in equilibrium whenever K > 2 is that both capital market
imperfections are not too severe and average productivity in the e±cient
¯rm is su±ciently high compared to all other ¯rm sizes.
(ii) When capital is scarce and the spread between upper and lower bound of
the endowment distribution su±ciently large, both 1 < n0 < K and n >
K ¯rms have positive measure in equilibrium if, in line with Assumption
A1, average output in n ¯rms is su±ciently high compared to n0 ¯rms
and average output in n and n0 ¯rms is su±ciently high compared to all
other ¯rm sizes, and capital market imperfections are su±ciently severe.
22Proof: In Appendix.
Part (i) of the proposition gives conditions for the ¯rm size distribution to
be degenerate at the e±cient ¯rm size. Not surprisingly, the set of necessary
condition relaxes if average productivity in K ¯rms is high compared to all
other ¯rm sizes. However, it is possible for any technology to ¯nd capital
market imperfections su±ciently severe such that an equilibrium with only
e±ciently sized ¯rms cannot occur for any distribution of endowments. Part
(ii) states then the desired result of the emergence of both too small and too
large ¯rms in equilibrium which demands su±ciently imperfect capital and a
relatively high average output in these ¯rms compared to other ¯rm sizes, as
long as covered by Assumption A1.
4.2 Large Firms and Mean Preserving Spreads
The next step is to analyze whether a redistribution of initial endowments
can a®ect technical e±ciency in the economy. To this end we determine the
e®ects of a mean preserving spread in the endowment distribution on the
size distribution of ¯rms. As probability mass moves from the center of the
endowment distribution to its tails, both the measures of prospective owners of
and of workers in large ¯rms increase. This in turn leads to an increase of the
measures of large ¯rms at the cost of small ¯rms and moves the equilibrium
¯rm size distribution to the right. The following proposition captures this
insight but ¯rst a technical de¯nition is required.
De¯nition 3 Let F, G be endowment distribution functions with mean !M.
G is said to a redistribution from owners to workers from F satisfying the
single crossing property if for some ^ ! such that ^ n ´ jµ(i)j 6= 0 for !i = ^ ! in
equilibrium under F
F(!) ¸ G(!)8! < ^ ! and F(!) · G(!)8! > ^ !
holds.
A transition from F to G describes a redistribution of endowments from owners
to workers such that owners of n > ^ n ¯rms transfers endowments to agents
that hold less ownership than ^ n.14
14Note that F must be a mean preserving spread of G.
23Proposition 3 Let the endowment distribution G be a redistribution from
owners to workers from the the endowment distribution F as in De¯nition 3.
Let G reduce the measure of agents willing to work in ^ n ¯rms under endowment
distribution F. In an economy with endowment distribution G the measure of
n > ^ n ¯rms cannot be greater than in an economy with endowment distribution
F. In particular, the the largest ¯rm size nmax > ^ n in the economy with F
cannot be smaller than the largest ¯rm size in the economy with G.
Proof: In Appendix.
Proposition 3 states that suitable redistributions of initial endowments
from owners to workers in fact prevents the formation of ine±ciently large
¯rms. A reshu²e of measure from the tails of the endowment distribution to
the center simply leaves less agents willing to participate in large ¯rms either as
workers or as owners. More generally, it follows that the measure of large ¯rms
and thus the skewness of the ¯rm size distribution depend on the kurtosis of
the wealth distribution. The higher the kurtosis of the endowment distribution
the more large ¯rms emerge and the more is the ¯rm size distribution skewed
to the right.
On the other hand, Proposition 3 tells an important story about the dy-
namics of inequality in the model economy. Whenever endowments are scarce,
a decrease in endowment inequality can lead to a decrease in the measure of
large ¯rms suggesting a more equal distribution of income. Therefore the
model is consistent with a non-monotonic evolution of inequality as long as
the economy has not grown enough for endowments to be abundant. To char-
acterize the e®ect of changes in inequality on the size distribution of ¯rms
is the aim of the next proposition. A change inducing scarcity of workers
(owners) for all ¯rm sizes is typically associated with less (more) inequality as
relatively less (more) agents are poor after the distributional change. A special
case of such a change in the endowment distribution is a uniform scarcity of
workers (owners), that is labor demand exceeds (falls short of) labor supply
by the same measure for all ¯rms.
Proposition 4 Assume a unimodal endowment distribution. Let a redistribu-
tion from owners (workers) to workers (owners) of the endowment distribution
induce a uniform scarcity of workers (owners) given old side payments and the
new interest rate. Then all side payments decrease (increase), however side
24payments in smaller ¯rms increase (decrease) relative to side payments in
larger ¯rms.
Proof: In Appendix.
This proposition tells primarily a story about the evolution of side pay-
ments as inequality in endowments changes in a certain way. But it contains
a more general insight, in that side payments in small ¯rms are a®ected rel-
atively less by certain changes in the endowment distribution than those in
larger ¯rms. A particular intriguing corollary of Proposition 4 is that as in-
equality decreases su±ciently inducing a uniform scarcity of workers, the ¯rm
size distribution converges to a point measure at n = K provided the capital
imperfection is not overly severe, see Proposition 2, and otherwise to a point
measure at n = 1.
It has to be emphasized that more equality in the limit tends to be asso-
ciated with higher aggregate output because output e±ciency is not related
directly to credit market imperfections. One could argue, for instance, that a
move towards more equally distributed initial endowments increases e±ciency
because an imperfect credit market that wastes resources is needed less for
the proper allocation of endowments. Although this line of reasoning applies
to payo®s, which increase as credit market activity declines, aggregate output
is only in°uenced by the friction in the capital market through changes in the
equilibrium allocation. On the other hand, the e®ect on aggregate output of
a move towards more equality in the distribution of endowments is ambigu-
ous. Depending on parameters, the resulting shift in the ¯rm size distribution
towards larger ¯rms can rise the measure of e±cient K ¯rms su±ciently to
o®set the distorting e®ect on ¯rms of other sizes.
4.3 Heterogeneity of Large Firms
As we have just shown, the measure of large ¯rms that emerge in equilibrium
depends on the range and the kurtosis of the endowment distribution. Now we
are interested in the properties of the distribution of n > 1 ¯rms and which
circumstances favor heterogeneity in those large ¯rms, that is the variance
of the ¯rm size distribution. Equilibrium ¯rm sizes are determined by the
con°icting interests of poor agents and rich agents. Poor agents wish to work
in small ¯rms whereas rich agents are likely to prefer greater ¯rm sizes. More
exactly, an agent's preferred ¯rm size increases in wealth. This means large
25¯rms will be more heterogenous with respect to size the scarcer potential large
¯rm owners are and the more heterogenous these are, that is the more right-
skewed the endowment distribution is.
Proposition 5 A necessary condition for a ¯rm of size n > 1 to emerge in
equilibrium is that (i) the spread between ! and ! is su±ciently large and
endowments are abundant, or (ii) endowments are scarce and ! is su±ciently
large.
Proof: In Appendix.
This proposition states e®ectively that economies having wealth distribu-
tions with larger support, that is a larger spread between lower and upper
bound of the endowment distribution, ! and !, tend to have more ine±cient
and therefore larger ¯rms in equilibrium. Whenever endowments are scarce,
¯rms tend to be larger for unequal endowment distributions, that is for those
with high skewness and a Paretian right tail. Then the interest rate is high,
but endowments of the wealthiest unmatched agent, !U, are relatively small
due to the large measure of agents in the left tail.
This indicates that the endowment level of the richest individual a®ects
the size distribution of ¯rms beyond the result on mean preserving spreads in
the last subsection. Connecting this with Proposition 4 implies that the size
of the largest ¯rms tends to increase with a change in the endowment distri-
bution such that the gap between rich and poor widens and owners become
scarce. The latter is attributable to an increase in skewness of the endowment
distribution. Thus skewness appears to favor a heterogenous ¯rm landscape
in the sense that there are large ¯rms of di®erent sizes.
4.4 The Income Distribution
The income distribution in equilibrium is key to the dynamics of the ¯rm size
distribution, as it determines next period's endowment distribution. Conse-
quently, it is of particular interest whether the distribution of income is more
or less unequal than the endowment distribution in terms of Propositions 3 to
5. Note that an agent's income is given by vi(n¤;µ¤;!(i);r¤). Suppose for the
moment that ! > 0 in order to properly de¯ne the endowment gap for agents
i and j, !(i) > !(j), as
!(i)
!(j). De¯ne the income gap between the same agents
i and j likewise as
vi(:)
vj(:). The following proposition characterizes the link from
endowment to income distribution.
26Proposition 6 An agent's income is weakly increasing in endowments. More-
over, the income gap between the richest and the poorest agent in the economy
exceeds the endowment gap if the poorest agent remains unmatched in equilib-
rium. However, the endowment gap between the richest and the poorest agent
matched into some ¯rm of size n exceeds the income gap.
Proof: In Appendix.
Proposition 6 provides a valuable insight. For capital scarce economies in-
come inequality exceeds endowment inequality between unmatched agents and
agents matched into ¯rms but not between workers and owners. This ¯nding
suggests that a dynamic version of the model will be compatible with a non-
monotonic relationship of inequality and growth. On the one hand the income
distribution of those agents matched is less unequal than the endowment dis-
tribution of those agents incorporating a trickle-down e®ect of growth. On
the other hand the trickle-down e®ect does not extend to those agents remain-
ing unmatched creating greater income inequality than endowment inequality
between agents employed or owning and those agents remaining in autarky.
As the capital stock grows less agents remain in autarky and the trickle-down
e®ect dominates. Moreover, there is a dual economy °avor to the dynamics
of this model. Whether the economy is able to transform into an economy of
¯rms from an economy consisting of agents living in economic autarky then
depends largely on the economies' ability to generate capital stock growth and
thus on agents' optimal saving policies.
5 Application
5.1 Bimodal Size Distributions
In this section we consider the extent to which the model is able to capture
empirical ¯ndings on ¯rm size distributions in di®erent countries. Firm size
distributions in developing countries are typically characterized by the missing
middle (see e.g. Tybout, 2000). That is, the share of the work force employed
in intermediately sized ¯rms is signi¯cantly less than both the share of those
employed in small or large ¯rms. A su±cient condition for this is that the
size distribution of ¯rms is bimodal with one peak to left and the other one to
the right of the mean. In contrast, developed economies typically have single
peaked distributions of workforce per ¯rm size with the modus to the left of
27the mean. Suppose that the endowment density is single peaked and strictly
increasing to the left of its peak while strictly decreasing to the right of it.
Proposition 4 already suggests how a bimodal size distribution of ¯rms
may emerge. Starting from a relatively equal distribution, in the sense that it
is almost degenerate at its mean, and reshu²ing measure to induce mean pre-
serving spreads, that yield a uniform scarcity of owners, makes side payments
in smaller ¯rms decrease relative to those in large ¯rms. For a su±ciently large
reshu²e of measure and su±ciently severe capital market imperfections this
will induce the measure of some n ¯rm to exceed the measure of some n0 ¯rm
with n > n0 > 1 as larger ¯rms become more attractive to potential owners in
equilibrium. Given that there still remains su±cient probability mass around
!(i) = c the measure of symmetric ¯rms exceeds that of smaller n > 1 ¯rms
and the size distribution of ¯rms is bimodal. On the other hand, necessary
conditions for a bimodal distribution are given in the following (heuristic)
proposition.
Proposition 7 Necessary conditions for a bimodal ¯rm size distribution in
equilibrium are su±cient skewness of the endowment distribution and (i) for
the left peak su±cient average output of some small ¯rm compared to larger
¯rms or su±cient mass of the endowment distribution around the mean, or
(ii) for the right peak a Paretian right tail or su±cient average output of some
large ¯rm compared to smaller ¯rms.
Proof: In Appendix.
This means that for a bimodal size distribution to prevail either some
n > 2 ¯rm must be very e±cient at least locally, that means compared to the
next smaller sized ¯rm, or side payments in that n ¯rm must be particularly
high which can only be the case if owners for this ¯rm are scarce and thus
the endowment distribution su±ciently skewed. This re°ects the simple fact
that there must be both enough agents weakly preferring to work in such a
¯rm and enough agents willing to own them. Depending on which market side
is relatively scarce, side payments in this ¯rm type must be extreme - either
high or low. For the left peak to emerge su±cient endowment measure around
c and a su±ciently high degree of capital market imperfections is needed as
well. The intuition for this is that the bargaining ine±ciency increases with
¯rm size as long as the capital market is not perfect.
28In case of particularly high side payments for some n > 2 ¯rm, we know
from Proposition 4 that side payments increase faster for larger ¯rms as the
measure of agents willing to work exceeds the measure of owners proportion-
ately for any large ¯rm. This means that the general level of side payments
has to be su±ciently high in the economy which is only possible if the endow-
ment distribution is very skewed and there are many poor and few rich agents
and capital market imperfections are su±ciently severe. An illustration of this










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9distribution represented by the darker bars has a left peak at symmetric n = 1
¯rms and a right peak at n = 5 ¯rms. The lighter bars represent the overall
workforce allocated to each size category. It is notable that the e±cient ¯rm
size in this case is K = 3 and the renegotiation payo®s are determined by
intra-¯rm bargaining (Stole and Zwiebel, 1996).
Now suppose the mode shifts to the right while preserving the mean as
depicted in Figure 3. As a consequence, probability mass is shifted away
from the tails which may result in a loss of the right tail's Paretian properties.
Then less agents want to own or work in large ¯rms and the size density moves
slightly to the left. A move from a very unequal endowment distribution to a
more equal one transforms a bimodal ¯rm size distribution into a single-peaked
one.
5.2 Inequality and E±ciency
Given an economy has a bimodal ¯rm size distribution in equilibrium what
are the implications for the e±ciency of the allocation? Unfortunately, they
appear to be ambiguous at best as a bimodal ¯rm size distribution in this
model may re°ect either a very ine±cient allocation with the intermediate
¯rm sizes being e±cient, as in the example in ¯gures 2 and 3, or a more
e±cient allocation with one of the peaks on the e±cient size. At the heart of
this lies the fact that intra-¯rm bargaining leads to an unequal distribution of
pro¯ts within ¯rms which can only be compensated ex ante by side payments
using the imperfect capital market. Hence, it depends on the capital market
imperfection which ¯rm size turns out to be the most attractive one given that
side payments must compensate workers for intra-¯rm bargaining.
As Proposition 2 suggests, a high degree of capital market imperfections
precludes the formation of only e±cient K > 1 ¯rms even when the endowment
distribution is degenerate. In this case inequality in endowments can serve to
bypass an improperly functioning capital market and therefore more inequality
in the sense of skewness and kurtosis may increase aggregate income (see e.g.
GrÄ uner and Schils (2002) for a similar ¯nding). Whenever capital market
imperfections are not too severe, an unequal distribution of ¯rm pro¯ts ex
post can successfully be compensated by side payments. In this case a move
towards more equality in the endowment distribution drives down the level
of side payments required to equate labor supply and demand, so that in the
limit only e±cient ¯rms emerge.
305.3 Increasing Aggregate Endowments
E±ciency and the shape of the ¯rm size distribution also depend on the ag-
gregate wealth of the model economy. This insight lies at the heart of the
discussion on desirability of foreign aid and foreign direct investments. This
subsection provides examples of the e®ects of both in our framework. If en-
dowments are scarce, Proposition 2 states that side payments are positive for
all ¯rm sizes. This implies immediately that for capital market clearing to
hold the poorest agents remain unmatched as they need to borrow to pay the
side payments. Scarcity of endowments may also be associated with a scarcity
of owners. In this case the ¯rm size distribution is largely determined by the
¯rm size choices of rich agents. Adding wealth into this economy does not nec-
essarily lead to a more e±cient allocation or an increase in aggregate income.
If despite the increase in aggregate endowments workers are still su±ciently
abundant, the e±ciency of the allocation depends mainly on the distribution
of the additional wealth.
To illustrate this idea let us conduct a thought experiment by dropping
additional capital on the economy. Formally, we shift the whole endowment
density to the right and increase skewness. Thus aggregate endowments in-
crease (by approximately three percent in this case) while holding the cost of
an asset constant at c. The e±cient ¯rm size is again K = 3 in this example.
Details of the parametrization can be found in the appendix. Endowment
densities are depicted to the left in Figure 4 and the corresponding workforce
distributions across ¯rms to the right. Note that the bars represent measures
of agents being member of a ¯rm of the respective size. The dashed line repre-
sents the initial endowment distribution and the endowment distribution after
the increase in wealth is depicted by the solid line. Workforce distributions
are drawn to the right in Figure 4 with the darker bars corresponding to the
equilibrium before the increase in wealth.
Given the initial endowment distribution, workers are relatively abundant
and owners relatively scarce. As aggregate wealth increases su±ciently, this
might reverse. However, if aggregate wealth increases by a moderate amount,
workers remain abundant whereas the measure of owners increases and thus
the measure of e±cient K ¯rms may decrease. In the case of Figure 4 more
agents become members of ine±ciently large n = 5 ¯rms. This is favored by
the rightward shu²e of a substantial amount of probability mass among the
poorly endowed and by the fact that the interest rate has to decrease.


































Figure 4: An increase in wealth leading to a decrease in income
Of course, the e®ect in the example is of transitory nature only. If en-
dowments of the poorest agent increase su±ciently so do equilibrium outside
options, notably the payo® from being member of a symmetric ¯rm. This
drives down side payments and ultimately moves the ¯rm size distribution to-
wards a single peaked one. Whether the modus sits at the e±cient ¯rm size or
at symmetric ¯rms depends on the severity of the capital market imperfection
and on relative productivity as in Proposition 2.
To achieve an increase in aggregate income or even productivity in this
particular case, aggregate endowments must increase su±ciently or the addi-
tional endowments must be distributed appropriately. This means here that
the capital injection should induce receivers of capital to own K ¯rms. For
economies with scarce endowments and a large e±cient ¯rm size, a uniform
increase of endowments tends primarily to increase the measure of small and
large ¯rms. Only when poor agents become su±ciently scarce may the general
equilibrium e®ect on side payments facilitate the formation of large e±cient
¯rms.
Now suppose that we add a small measure of very rich agents to an economy
where workers are abundant and side payments are high, as in the example.
Given that the additional endowments are su±ciently few then workers may
still be abundant for all ¯rm sizes, in the sense of Proposition 4. In this
case very rich agents face high side payments and ¯nd it optimal to set up
large ¯rms. Then, as in Figure 4, the right tail of the size distribution tends
to gain measure. If the e±cient ¯rm size is small but greater than 1 this
decreases productivity and may decrease even aggregate output. This can
be interpreted as an in°ux of foreign direct investment adding a measure of
32agents facing foreign capital cost and not being subject to the local credit
market imperfections. Therefore economies with high wealth inequality and
scarce endowments need not bene¯t from foreign direct investments unless the
amount of investment is su±ciently large.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
Allowing for partial and joint ownership, i.e. dropping Assumption 2, results
primarily in adding another dimension of complexity to notation and analysis
of equilibrium allocation. Joint ownership of the factory, that is asset AI,
could be accommodated relatively easily, changing the size of the symmetric
¯rm size to the e±cient one and thus replacing symmetric n = 1 ¯rms by
symmetric n = K ¯rms. A natural application of this is the emergence of
cooperatives, for instance. In this case the ¯rm size distribution converges
always to the e±cient one when capital market imperfections or endowment
inequality vanish and e®ects on e±ciency in the previous section become less
ambiguous. Otherwise the results carry over.
By introducing partial ownership another set of cuto® endowment levels
emerges that allows a ¯ner coarsening of the type space. Therefore the main
e®ect of an extension of the model would be to create a new investment op-
portunity with cost situated between those of n = 1 and n = 2 ¯rms. Asset
investments that induce this cost to agents involve agents owning one or two
assets thus qualifying for n = 1 or n = 2 ¯rms. While there may emerge some
shifting of equilibrium measure between these ¯rm types the general property
of the model that poorer agents choose less and richer agents more ownership
of assets does not change. As it is exactly this feature that drives the missing
middle result in section 6, we conjecture that distributional results will not be
a®ected signi¯cantly by admitting partial ownership. As owners of only type
II assets too have an incentive of increasing ¯rm size beyond the e±cient one
(see Gall, 2004) the scope for changing the central ¯nding that both too large
and too small ¯rms emerge in equilibrium appears to be quite limited.
We are able to present an example where partial ownership can be fully
admitted by capping ¯rm size at n = 3 assets AII in order to keep the model
numerically solvable. The results of a numerical simulation of this model are
shown in ¯gure 5.15 The lighter bars show the distribution of the workforce and
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Figure 5: An example with partial ownership
the darker bars the distribution of ¯rms according to their size. Parameters
are chosen such that the e±cient coalition size is K = 2, that is a coalition with
two assets. Indeed, both too small and too large productive coalitions emerge
in equilibrium and there appears a missing middle of the size distribution of
business ¯rms.
The view that AI and AII in this model resemble productive non-human
assets as a factory building and machines is by no means exclusive. It is
consistent with the model to let these assets stand for e.g. plants thus giving
an indication ine±cient vertical integration and empire building. This points
to an interesting reinterpretation of the model: for instance asset AI might
be a brand and asset AII a plant. Then endowment inequality determines the
variety of goods produced in an economy. In the examples in section 5 more
unequal endowment distributions translate into less variety of goods consistent
with empirical facts.
An extension of this work could analyze the e®ects of the development of
contractual and labor institutions, for instance by introducing pro¯t sharing
contracts. Here arises a neat connection to the work of Williamson (2000)
proposing a theory of developing institutions where secure property rights
emerge before contract enforcement. In this sense this work aims to contribute
to an institutional explanation of economic development.
How do our ¯ndings ¯t into the big picture of development economics? We
already mentioned that within developing economies the distribution of labor
force among ¯rm sizes is frequently found to be bimodal, and in that way to
lack labor in intermediately sized ¯rms. This feature is not known for industri-
alized economies. Our model is able to explain this empirical fact as bimodal
34¯rm size distributions emerge for very skewed endowment distributions with a
Paretian right tail. As endowment inequality decreases and the modus shifts
to the right the ¯rm size distribution becomes uni-modal. Moreover, under
intra-¯rm bargaining an increase in endowments does not necessarily lead to
an increase of production, especially if endowments are scarce, the poor abun-
dant and the additional endowments are not distributed exactly as to induce
additional demand for ownership of e±cient ¯rms. Moreover, the model gen-
erates a wedge in income of unmatched agents and members of ¯rms thus
creating a potential for class societies reminiscent of the dual economy. This
suggests that the model provides an adequate instrument for policy analysis
of the industrial sector in developing countries.
35A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
(i) Let µ1 denote asset holdings in coalition N1 and µ2 those in coalition N2.
Assume without loss of generality that jµ1(i)j > jµ2(i)j for some agent i who
is assumed to be able to ¯nance assets using his wealth for now. Then agent
i prefers µ1 in N1 to µ2 in N2 if and only if:
vi(n1;µ1;!(i);r) > vi(n2;µ2;!(i);r)
, ¼i(n1;µ1)+(1+r)(!(i)¡jµ1(i)jc) > ¼i(n2;µ2)+(1+r)(!(i)¡jµ2(i)jc)
, ¼i(n1;µ1(i)) ¡ ¼i(n2;µ2) > (1+r)(jµ1(i)j ¡ jµ2(i)j)c: (10)
This means that preference for more asset ownership is non-increasing in the
interest rate. Firstly, note that inequality (10) strictly tightens in r. Secondly,
there exist a unique r0 such that (10) holds with equality implying preferences
for ownership are well-de¯ned with respect to r. An analogous argument
applies to the case of an agent having to borrow to ¯nance jµ2(i)j assets.
However, for endowments jµ1(i)jc > !(i) > jµ2(i)jc inequality (10) changes
into
¼i(n1;µ1)¡¼i(n2;µ2) > (1+r)(!(i)¡jµ2(i)jc)¡(1+i)(!(i)¡jµ1(i)jc);
where (1 + i) = (1 + r)°. This has the same properties with respect to r as
(10), so that the above result applies.
(ii) Let µ1, µ2, n1, n2 be de¯ned as above. Now we show that a preference
relation of agent i over (µ1;n1) and (µ2;n2) has a unique endowment level
for which it reverses. Agent i prefers the ¯rst to the second if, depending on
the degree to which µ1(i) and µ2(i) have to be ¯nanced by debt, one of the
following inequalities holds





for !(i) 2 (jµ2(i)jc;jµ1(i)jc); or
¼i(n1;µ1)¡¼i(n2;µ2) > (1+r)(jµ1(i)j¡jµ2(i)j)c for !(i) ¸ jµ1(i)jc: (11)




[¼i(n2;µ2) ¡ ¼i(n1;µ1) + (1+i)(jµ1(i)j ¡ jµ2(i)j)c] + jµ2(i)jc:
36Clearly, !2 is unique given r. Note that whenever !2 < jµ2(i)jc this implies that
the ¯rst inequality of (11) holds. On the other hand, whenever !2 > jµ1(i)jc
this implies that the third inequality of (11) holds. To see this, let !2 > jµ1(i)jc.
Plugging this into the last equation yields
(i¡r)(jµ1(i)j¡jµ2(i)j)c < ¼i(n2;µ2) ¡ ¼i(n1;µ1) + (1+i)(jµ1(i)j¡jµ2(i)j)c:
This inequality can easily be transformed to yield the reverse of the third
inequality of (11). Thus !2 > jµ1(i)jc implies that for all endowment levels
(µ2;n2) is preferred to (µ1;n2) by agent i. Hence, a unique endowment cuto®
value !0 can be de¯ned, such that for all endowments !(i) > !0, (µ1;n1) is





! if !2 < jµ2(i)jc
! if !2 > jµ1(i)jc
!2 otherwise.
This means !0 is unique as well and agents' preferences are well-de¯ned with
respect to endowments. Moreover, it is easy to see that !0 is non-decreasing
in r. The unique cuto® level implies that at most agents with a unique endow-
ment level may be indi®erent between any two alternatives of asset ownership
and coalition size. Therefore preferences are strict almost everywhere on I. ¥
Proof of Lemma 3
The ¯rst statement in the lemma can be established by noting that in any
equilibrium satisfying the stability condition an owner of an n > 1 ¯rm must
be indi®erent between any worker when hiring. If that is not the case there
always exist blocking coalitions of owners not hiring their favorite workers and
these workers. This follows from the fact that all owners prefer to hire the
same rich workers and the utility bene¯t an owner has from a worker's wealth
is equal for all owners that have to borrow. This immediately implies that
monetary side payments only depend on the ¯rm size.
Continuing we note that workers' transfers to owners must be decreasing
in ¯rm size for all ¯rm sizes present in equilibrium. Suppose the contrary and





37n worker with endowment !(i) prefers working in an n ¯rm to an n0 ¯rm if
¼W(n) + (1 + r)(!(i) ¡
t(n)
n
) > ¼W(n0) + (1 + r)(!(i) ¡
t(n0)
n0 ) or
¼W(n) + (1 + r)°(!(i) ¡
t(n)
n
) > ¼W(n0) + (1 + r)(!(i) ¡
t(n0)
n0 ) or
¼W(n) + (1 + r)°(!(i) ¡
t(n)
n
) > ¼W(n0) + (1 + r)°(!(i) ¡
t(n0)
n0 );












n0 > !(i). That is











n0 ) ¡ (° ¡ 1)!(i)] or






which leads to a contradiction in all three cases noting that the LHS of all
inequality is negative. ¥
Proof of Proposition 1
We proceed by ¯rst establishing existence and uniqueness of a matching equi-
librium given some interest rate r¤. That is we use De¯nition 2 without capital
market clearing. Then we show that r¤ such that (5) holds exists and is unique.
Existence of the matching equilibrium
The proof of existence closely follows Legros and Newman (1996). Let the in-
terest rate be given by r¤. A modi¯ed version of µ, µM, is needed to construct a
super-additive characteristic function of the matching economy (I;µ;vi) along
the lines of Shubik and Wooders (1983). De¯ne a modi¯ed µM(N), N 2 F(I)
as follows:
µM : F(I) ! fAI;AII;;gR £ [0;1];
µM(N) = (µ(N);q(N));
where q(N) 6= q(O), with N;O 2 F(I), whenever N 6= O. q(N) speci¯es the
index of the set of assets the members of coalition N own. Feasible ownership
rights are de¯ned by
£M(N) = (£(N);q(N)):
38Essentially, this postulates that in a coalition any member's ownership right
must be assigned the same index and otherwise be feasible in the sense used
above. Now let V (O) with O =
S
k Ok, where Ok 2 F(I) are disjoint ¯nite
sets of agents, denote the characteristic function of the economy (I;µM;vi):
V (O) = f(vi(jOj;µM;!(i);r¤))i2O : for i 2 Ok µM(Ok) 2 £M(Ok)8Oi µ Og:
V (O) describes the set of agents' attainable payo® vectors in coalitions Ok ½ O
achievable by choosing ownership rights allocations. Note that the notation
using O is equivalent to a notation using the corresponding vector of attributes
(!1;!2;:::;!n) as in Kaneko and Wooders (1996). Let o = jOj. This notation
ensures that any union of disjoint coalitions can use the same allocation as
the disjoint coalitions. Then construct the comprehensive extension of V (O)
by de¯ning
^ V (O) = fx 2 Ro : x · V (O)g:
^ V (O) has the following properties:
^ V is a non-empty, closed subset of Ro 8 O 2 F(I); (12)
^ V (O) £ ^ V (O0) µ ^ V (O [ O0) 8 O;O0 2 F(I); (13)
inf sup ^ V (fig) > ¡1; (14)
8 O 2 F(I);x 2 ^ V (O) and y 2 Ro with y · x ) y 2 ^ V (O); (15)
8 O 2 F(I); ^ V (O) ¡
[
i2O
[(int ^ V (fig)) £ Ro¡1] is non-empty and bounded.
(16)
Properties 12, 13 and 15 follow directly by de¯nition. Property 14 follows
from the existence of an outside option, V (fig) ¸ 0. This and the de¯nition
of ^ V also imply property 16. Therefore ^ V is a characteristic function in the
sense of Kaneko and Wooders (1986).
Let us represent all agents i1;i2;:::;ip 2 O by their respective wealth !(ik).
Then it is straightforward that also
^ V (!(i½(1));!(i½(2));:::;!(i½(p))) = f(x½(1);x½(2);:::;x½(p)) : (x1;x2;:::;xp)
2 ^ V (!(i1);!(i2);:::;!(ip))g
for all permutations ½ of O. Thus the conditions Comprehensiveness (property
14), Nontriviality (implied by property 16), and Anonymity in Kaneko and
39Wooders (1996) are met. We know from Lemma 2 that coalition sizes are
bounded above by n. The last condition to show is continuity of fx 2 Rp :
V (fig) · x · V (O)g on [0;1]n for n = 1;:::;n which trivially holds.
Admitting transfers of a limited kind as de¯ned by equation (2) we are in
a position to apply the Theorem of Kaneko and Wooders (1996) and thus have
proven existence of the f-core of the characteristic function game associated
with ^ V . What remains to be shown is that an allocation in the f-core of ^ V
is also an equilibrium as in De¯nition 2 without capital market clearing. An
allocation in the f-core of ^ V for some O 2 F gives rise to payo®s ^ x 2 ^ V (O)
that cannot be improved upon in the sense of stability. For x 2 V (O) it must
hold that x ¸ ^ x by construction of ^ V . Then for the equilibrium allocation
neither can x be improved upon. Finally, by de¯nition of V (:) for all x 2
V (O) and ^ x 2 ^ V (O) such that ^ x · x there exist disjoint subsets of O, Ok,
a mapping µM, and side payments t such that xi = vi(jOkj;µM;!(i);r;t(i)).
De¯ne for all j 2 [0;1] Oj = fi 2 I : µM(i) = (µ(i);j)g. Then the collection
(Oj;j 2 [0;1] : Oj 6= ;) de¯nes the equilibrium coalitions in the sense of our
equilibrium de¯nition.
Uniqueness of the matching equilibrium
The proof will establish that for any matching equilibrium given r¤ the equi-
librium allocation of ¯rms, that is (¹n)n:¹n>0, is determined by side payments
t which depend on ¯rm size only. We will ¯rst proof uniqueness of side pay-
ments consistent with stability and measure consistency. Then we will show
that ¹n is indeed uniquely determined by side payments almost everywhere.
Step 1: Uniqueness of side payments. As a preliminary de¯ne measures
¹strict
nM and ¹strict
nW as the measures of agents strictly preferring to be owner of
n ¯rms, or worker in n ¯rms, respectively, to all other roles in ¯rms that have
positive measure in equilibrium. An equilibrium vector of side payments t
induces stability and measure consistency which imply jointly
¹strict
nM · ¹n · ¹nM and ¹strict
nW · n¹n · ¹nW: (17)
By de¯nitions (6) and (7) and for the strict versions accordingly, the mea-
sures ¹nM, ¹nW and ¹strict
nM , ¹strict
nW are fully characterized by side payments
t(n). In particular, by inspection of the endowment cuto® values !M(n;:) and
!W(n;:) as can be derived using the proof of Lemma 3, the measures ¹nW
and ¹strict
nW strictly decrease in t(n) for ¹nW;¹strict
nW 2 (0;1) and the measures
40¹nM, ¹strict
nM strictly increase in t(n) for ¹nM;¹strict
nM 2 (0;1). Note further
that if ¹nMjt(n) > ¹strict
nM jt(n) for t0(n) 6= t(n), all other side payments equal,
¹nMjt0(n) = ¹strict
nM jt0(n) and likewise for ¹nW and ¹strict
nW . Hence, some ¹n con-
sistent with t is not consistent with t0 such that t(j) = t0(j) for all j 6= n with
positive measure except for t(n) 6= t0(n).
Let n0 denote the next smaller ¯rm size and n00 the next bigger ¯rm size
with respect to n with positive measure under t. By Lemma 3 we know that
matching is negative assortative. This implies that ¹nW and ¹strict
nW strictly
increase in t(n0) and t(n00. ¹nM and ¹strict
nM strictly decrease in t(n0) and t(n00).
Suppose now there exist systems of side payments t 6= t0, both associated
with a corresponding matching equilibrium such that conditions (17) hold.
Case fn : ¹n > 0jtg = fn : ¹n > 0jt0g: Let n, n0, and n00 have positive
measure under both t and t0. It follows that if t(n) < t0(n) then t0(n0) > t(n0)
and t0(n00) > t(n00) is necessary for ¹n, such that conditions (17) hold, to exist.
An analogous argument applies to t(n) > t0(n).
This implies that for t0 6= t conditions (17) cannot hold if fn : ¹n > 0jtg =
fn : ¹n > 0jt0g. To see this, let ¹n, ¹n0 and ¹n00 have positive measure each
and suppose without loss of generality t(n) < t0(n). Then ¹nM and its strict
version increases, ¹n0
M and ¹n00
M and their strict counterparts decrease. ¹nW
and its strict counterpart decreases, and ¹n0
W and ¹n00
W and their strict versions
all increase. Increasing t(n0) or t(n00) to induce measure consistency again the
same e®ect appears on the next smaller and bigger ¯rms from a point of view
of n0 and n00 ¯rms. By induction all side payments in t0 must increase. Hence,
for the biggest ¯rm size in equilibrium, the measure of agents willing to own
necessarily exceeds the measure of agents willing to work, thus violating (17).
If jfn : ¹n > 0jtgj < 3 the argument can be applied accordingly.
Case fn : ¹n > 0jtg \ fn : ¹n > 0jt0g = ;: Then there exists n0 with zero
measure under t but positive measure under t0 and n with positive measure
under t but zero measure under t0 such that n0 is the next bigger or larger
¯rm size with respect to n. This is a contradiction to stability. To see this,
suppose that at side payments t there does not exist t0(n0) such that n0 is
preferred to n by both workers and owners, an implication of stability of the
equilibrium associated to t. At side payments t0(n0), however, by stability of
the equilibrium associated to t0 n0 is weakly preferred by a positive measure
of both owners and workers to n for all side payments t(n).
This means that a positive measure of both owners and workers must be
41indi®erent between n under t(n) and n0 under t0(n0). Positive measures of
both owners and workers for n ¯rms under t must induce measure consistency.
However, indi®erence of both workers and owners for more than two consecu-
tive ¯rm sizes is not possible generically, as four equalities determining cuto®
endowments have to hold with three degrees of freedom, an issue we will return
to in step (2) of this part of the proof. Hence, measure consistency cannot be
induced by an allocation with measure zero of n ¯rms and positive measure
of n0 ¯rms, a contradiction. This means fn : ¹n > 0jtg µ fn : ¹n > 0jt0g or
fn : ¹n > 0jtg ¶ fn : ¹n > 0jt0g.
Case fn : ¹n > 0jtg ¶ fn : ¹n > 0jt0g: Suppose without loss of generality
t(n) < t0(n) for some n with positive measure under both t and t0. As shown
previously this implies necessarily that t(n0) < t0(n0) and t(n00) < t0(n00). Sup-
pose the next smaller or bigger ¯rm size under t, say without loss of generality
n0, has zero measure under t0. To induce measure zero of n0 ¯rms t0 has to be
su±ciently greater than t for the labor supply in n0 ¯rms to collapse. But then
agents preferring to own n0 ¯rms have to be matched in n ¯rms and the next
smaller n000 ¯rms violating measure consistency for n ¯rms. Restoring measure
consistency for n000 and n ¯rms requires necessarily that side payments rise in
the next bigger and smaller ¯rms. This implies by induction that for the
biggest ¯rm size under t0 condition (17) cannot hold. This argument extends
by induction to cases where more than one ¯rm size has positive measure un-
der t but zero measure under t0. Reversing the argument by exchanging t with
t0 gives the same result for fn : ¹n > 0jtg µ fn : ¹n > 0jt0g.
Finally, the cases t(n) = t0(n) for all n 2 fn : ¹n > 0jtg \ fn : ¹n >
0jt0g either imply coincidence of side payments or can quickly be led to a
contradiction to stability.
Step 2: The allocation (P;µ) is unique in t almost everywhere. Only for
j¹strict
nM ¡ ¹nMj > 0 and j¹strict
nW ¡ ¹n · ¹nWj > 0 for n = n0;n, with n the
next higher ¯rm size than n0 and both ¯rm sizes with positive measure, is the
statement not trivial. But then measure consistency uniquely determines ¹n
and ¹n0, since to have j¹strict
nM ¡¹nMj > 0 and j¹strict
nW ¡¹n · ¹nWj > 0 for more
than two consecutive ¯rm sizes is not possible generically, as four equalities
determining cuto® endowments have to hold with three degrees of freedom
given by the side payments in the three ¯rms.
42Existence and uniqueness of r¤
Here only the case w < c is of interest. Therefore r¤ is given by conditions
(4). For both properties it su±ces to show that all three conditions are getting
slacker in r. Then (4) postulates that r¤ be the lowest non-negative interest
rate such that all weak inequalities hold. The ¯rst condition is equivalent to
^ ! ¸ !U: (18)
It follows immediately from the de¯nition of ^ !, (3), that it is increasing in r.








(1 + r)(° ¡ 1)
8!(i) < !U (19)
for all n with ¹n > 0 in the matching equilibrium as de¯ned in the last
subsection. The set of conditions (19) is relaxing in r and in t(n). Finally, no
agent has a pro¯table deviation by forming non-equilibrium larger n0 ¯rms if
! ·
¼M(n) ¡ ¼M(n0)
(1 + r)(° ¡ 1)
+ (n + 1)c +
°
° ¡ 1





for at least one n given any n0 with ¹n0 = 0 in equilibrium. ^ t(n0) is given by







Hence, the set of conditions (20) is relaxing in r and in t(n) as well. However,
the e®ect via side payments is second order. In particular, labor demand
decreases in r. This in turn means that the binding one of conditions (18), (19),
and (20) has relaxed. Because of continuity of the cuto® endowment levels in
r and t(:), the fact that !(:) is continuously di®erentiable, and the possibility
of agents' indi®erence between di®erent roles equilibrium side payments are
continuous in r as well. Given continuity in r of conditions (18), (19), and
(20) and that !(:) is continuously di®erentiable, ¹U is continuous in r as well,
which is all we need to show. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2
Starting with part (i) of the proposition, it is possible from this fact and
the above expressions to derive a cuto® endowment level for agents to prefer
43working in an e±cient K ¯rm as opposed to working (i) in an n > K ¯rm, in
(ii) an n0 < K ¯rm, or (iii) owning one asset in a symmetric ¯rm.
!(i) ¸






















¼W(K) ¡ ¼1 + (1 + r)°[c ¡
t(K)
K ]
















¼1 ¡ ¼M(K) + (1+r)°(Kc¡t(K))
(1+r)(°¡1)
+ c; (22)
Assume now that endowments are scarce. We say an n ¯rm crowds out an
n0 ¯rm if, given equilibrium side payments t(n), there exist no side payments
t(n0) such that there is both positive measure of agents preferring to be owner
in n0 ¯rms and positive measure of agents preferring to be worker in n0 ¯rms
to the same role in n ¯rms.




























and for 1 < n0 < n.
Proof of Lemma: Assume ¯rst that n < n0. Then, by Lemma 1 for n ¯rms
to crowd out n0 ¯rms, given t(n) there must not exist t(n0) such that
!M(n;n0) · (n0 + 1)c ¡ t(n0) and !W(n;n0) ¸
t(n0)
n0 ;
44where !M(n;n0) and !W(n;n0) is the appropriate cuto® endowment level as








n0 ¸ 0 and
¼M(n) ¡ ¼M(n0)
1 + r
+ t(n) ¡ t(n0) + (n0 ¡ n)c · 0:
Solving for
t(n0)


















































(n ¡ K)(1 + r)
;










(K ¡ n0)(1 + r)°
;
Obtaining bounds on t(K) by comparing the e±cient ¯rm size with symmetric










Now it is possible to derive the desired necessary conditions. For all n > K














K ¡ n0[¼W(n0) ¡ ¼W(K)] +
¼M(n0) ¡ ¼M(K)





































Note that condition (25) holds for ° su±ciently close to 1 but the LHS of (25)
strictly increases in °. Moreover, the LHS of (25) decreases in the average
output of K ¯rms,
¦(K)
K+1 , all else equal. It remains inconclusive whether the
LHS of condition (24) increases or decreases in ° for ° À 1 and increases
in
¦(K)
K+1 . This means for su±ciently high ° the necessary conditions fail to
hold given the production function. Moreover, for given ° and production
technology, increasing ° or decreasing average output of K ¯rms cannot make
conditions (23) hold if they did not hold before, but it can make conditions
(23) fail if they held before.
For part (ii) of the Proposition, conditions (23) can be manipulated to
provide us with su±cient conditions for some n and n0 ¯rms to be preferred
by both some owners and some workers to K ¯rms. To have positive measure
of both n and n0 in equilibrium,
(i) both conditions (23) must not hold. We analyzed this case in the
previous part and found that su±ciently high ° and su±ciently low average









conditions (23) to fail.
(ii) n and n0 ¯rms must not crowd out each other and therefore conditions








n ¡ n0 +
¼M(n0) ¡ ¼1
n0 · 0 and
°
n0
n ¡ n0[¼W(n0) ¡ ¼W(n)] +
¼M(n0) ¡ ¼M(n)
n ¡ n0 + ¼1 ¡ ¼W(n) ¸ 0:





























































Both conditions always hold for su±ciently high ° and su±ciently high average
output of n ¯rms compared to n0 ¯rms. Additionally, positive measure of n
and n0 ¯rms implies that ! is su±ciently small and ! su±ciently large, as
! < !W(n;n0) < !M(n;n0) < !.
(iii) there must not exist any other ¯rm size n00 crowding out n or n0 ¯rms








n0 ¡ n00 +
¼M(n00) ¡ ¼1
n00 · 0 and
°
n0
n000 ¡ n0[¼W(n0) ¡ ¼W(n000)] +
¼M(n0) ¡ ¼M(n000)
n000 ¡ n0 + ¼1 ¡ ¼W(n0) ¸ 0;







n ¡ n00 +
¼M(n00) ¡ ¼1




[¼W(n) ¡ ¼W(n000)] +
¼M(n) ¡ ¼M(n000)
n000 ¡ n
+ ¼1 ¡ ¼W(n000) ¸ 0;
where n > n00 6= n0 and n0 6= n000 < n. The previous analysis, in particular
of inequalities (24) and (25), shows that if ° is su±ciently high and average
output in n0 and n ¯rms is su±ciently high compared to n00 and n000 ¯rms, the
set of conditions above holds. Then positive measures of both n and n0 ¯rms
emerge in equilibrium. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3
Let (P;µ;r;t) be an equilibrium associated to the endowment distribution F
induced by ! and G be a redistribution from owners to workers from F induced
by !0 in the sense of De¯nition 3. Then (P0;µ0;r0;t0) denotes the equilibrium
associated to !0(i).
Assume ¯rst that the interest rate remains constant, i.e. ¹0
U = ¹U or
R
I !(i)di ¸ c, as aggregate endowments do not change. By assumption µ(i) 6= ;
for !i = ^ !. Let ^ n = jµ(i)j. As
¹(!(i) · !) · ¹(!0(i) · !) 8! > ^ !;
47it must hold that
Pn
n=^ n+1 ¹nMj!;t ¸
Pn
n=^ n+1 ¹nMj!0;t.16 In particular, for
nmax > ^ n de¯ned as the biggest ¯rm size with ¹nmaxj! > 0, it must hold that
¹nmaxMj!0 < ¹nmaxMj!. Likewise, as additionally
¹(!(i) · !) ¸ ¹(!0(i) · !) 8! < ^ !;




n=m ¹Wnj!0;t because of
negative assortative matching and the fact that agents that are workers in ^ n




n>^ n ¹nj!;t ¸
P
n>^ n ¹nj!0;t if side payments and the interest rate
remained constant. Note that equality only holds if ! and !0 coincide for all i
with the property jµ(i)j 6= 1, i.e. for all agents in n > 1 ¯rms. This means both
supply and demand for n > ^ n workers weakly decrease. Equating supply and
demand using side payments then gives measures ¹nj!0;t0;r for which it must
hold that
Pn
n=^ n+1 ¹nj!0;t0;r ·
Pn
n=^ n+1 ¹nj!;t;r and for nmax in particular that
¹nmaxj!0;t0;r < ¹nmaxj!;t;r. However, it holds that !Uj!;t · !Uj!0;t. Moreover,
t 6= t0 so that capital market clearing as de¯ned in (5) may be violated. That
is the interest rate may have to adjust. Given that this is only a second order
e®ect decreasing one market side, it must hold that indeed
P
n>^ n ¹nj!;t;r ¸
P
n>^ n ¹nj!0;t0;r0 and ¹nmaxj!;t;r ¸ ¹nmaxj!0;t0;r0 which asserts the statement in
the proposition. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4
Let us ¯rst look at a stochastic decrease inducing a uniform scarcity of workers
given old side payments t and the old interest rate r. We denote measures
after the decrease given t and r by primes. That is,
¹Mn ¡ n¹Wn = ¹M0
n ¡ n0¹W0
n for t;!0;r:
Then t0(n) < t(n) for all n because workers are scarce. Moreover, !U · !0
U
and capital market clearing requires r0 > r. The cuto® endowment level to
prefer owning an n > 1 ¯rm to owning an n0 > n ¯rm is given by
wM(n;n0) =
¼M(n) ¡ ¼M(n0)




[°(t(n0) ¡ (n0 ¡ n)c) ¡ t(n)] + (n + 1)c
16We follow the convention of writing ¹Mnjt;! to indicate the measure of individuals weakly
preferring to be owners of n ¯rms given side payments t and the endowment distribution
!(i).
48if t(n) > t(n0) ¡ (n0 ¡ n)c. For the opposite case the following holds.
wM(n;n0) =
¼M(n0) ¡ ¼M(n)




[°t(n) ¡ t(n0) + (n0 ¡ n)c] + (n0 + 1)c:
For workers the cuto® endowment level to prefer an n > 1 ¯rm to an n0 > n
¯rm is given by
wW(n;n0) =
¼W(n0) ¡ ¼W(n)













n0 < ! <
t(n)
n . Therefore side payments cannot decrease uniformly, i.e.
t(n) ¡ t0(n) 6= t(n0) ¡ t0(n0) for some n 6= n0 > 1. Suppose the contrary. Then
clearly for both owners and workers, k = W;M, wk(n;n0) < w0
k(n;n0) and
w0
k(n;n0) ¡ wk(n;n0) = w0
k(n;n00) ¡ wk(n;n00) for all 1 < n < n0 < n00. This
means cuto® values increase linearly in transfers. This in turn implies that
measures of owners do not decrease uniformly but those of ¯rm sizes with
higher wM(:;n), i.e. the larger ¯rms, decrease slower. Measures of workers
increase faster for ¯rms with high per worker side payments, i.e. small ¯rms.
This means t(n) ¡ t0(n) < t(n0) ¡ t0(n0) for n < n0 and relative side payments
in small ¯rms increase relative to those of large ¯rms.
A similar argument applies to the case where a change in the endowment
distribution leads to uniform scarcity of owners. It is straightforward that all
side payments have to increase in this case. Proceeding analogously to the
above reasoning it can be shown that then relative side payments of small
¯rms decrease relative to those of large ¯rms. ¥
Proof of Proposition 5
The support of the ¯rm size distribution is given by fn : ¹n > 0g. Let the
greatest ¯rm size in the economy be denoted by n. If there exist large ¯rms
in equilibrium it must hold that
nmax = max
n·n¤(r¤)
fn : ¹nW > 0 ^ ¹nM > 0g:
To develop a necessary condition for a ¯rm of size n > 1 to emerge in an
equilibrium, note ¯rst that workers in and owners of equilibrium n > 1 ¯rms
must prefer this to being members of symmetric n0 = 1 ¯rms, i.e.
!M(n;1) =
¼1 ¡ ¼M(n)




[nc ¡ t(n)] and
!W(n;1) =
¼W(n) ¡ ¼1










49To have an n ¯rm in equilibrium it must necessarily hold that
! > !nM > !nW > !U:
Collecting terms yields
! >
°n(¼1 ¡ ¼W(n)) ¡ (¼M(n) ¡ ¼1)
(1 + r)(° ¡ 1)
+ °n!U ¡ (°n ¡ 1)c: (26)
This inequality weakens in the spread between ! and !U and in the interest
rate. !U is strictly increasing in ! and the endowment gap c¡w. The interest
rate in turn increases in !U. If endowments are abundant, then !U = !
and r = 0, and the necessary condition reduces to a su±ciently large spread
between ! and !. Of course, conditions analogous to condition 26 have to hold
for each n0 6= n and n > 1. Note that the necessary conditions give implicitly
an upper bound on the largest ¯rm size in equilibrium, nmax. ¥
Proof of Proposition 6
Monotonicity of incomes in endowments follows from a revealed preferences
argument. Suppose agent j chooses in equilibrium to be worker, i.e. µ(j) = ; in
an n ¯rm this giving rise to an upfront payment of t(n). Suppose further that
agent i chooses optimally some other combination of ¯rm size and ownership
rights, (n0;µ0(i)) leading to upfront payments greater than t(n). Formally,
vi(n;µ;:) < vi(n0;µ0;:) and
vj(n;µ;:) > vj(n0;µ0;:): (27)
Because of the credit market imperfection it must hold that
vi(n;µ;:) > vj(n;µ;:);
i.e. agent i would derive greater income from agent j's choice than agent j.
On the other hand, because of the asymmetry in investment cost, by Lemma
1 inequalities (27) can only hold if
!(j) < !(i):
This argument holds for any j and any combination of ¯rm size and ownership
rights, although weak inequalities apply for comparisons between agents with
equal asset ownership admitting for the case r = 0.
50Now we turn our attention to income and endowment gaps for agents
matched into n ¯rms. Let j denote the poorest agent in the economy with
endowments !(j) > 0 who is worker in an n ¯rm. Agent j's income is then
given by
vj(n;µ;:) = ¼W(n) + (1 + r)°(!(j) ¡ t(n));
assuming t(n) > !(j). Let i be the richest agent with endowments !(i) who
is owner of ¯rm n. Agent i's income is given by
vi(n;µ;:) = ¼M(n) + (1 + r)°(!(i) + nt(n) ¡ (n + 1)c);




(1 + r)°!(i) + ¼M(n) ¡ (1 + r)°((n + 1)c ¡ nt(n))
(1 + r)°!(j) + ¼W(n) ¡ (1 + r)°t(n)
: (28)
Note at this point that whenever the poorest agent with endowment ! > 0
were to remain unmatched in equilibrium, the income spread between this
agent and any ¯rm member l must exceed the endowment spread regardless
of whether the ¯rm member borrows or lends because the payo® of the ¯rm
member's equilibrium choice exceeds (1 + r)!(l) for almost all l. A necessary







¼M(n) ¡ (1 + r)°[(n + 1)c ¡ nt(n)]





This immediately implies that for su±ciently low side payments such that
¼M(n) < (1 + r)°[(n + 1)c ¡ nt(n)], the above inequality holds trivially. We
know that j prefers to be worker, so that
¼M(n) + (1 + r)°[!(j) ¡ (n + 1)c + nt(n)] < ¼W(n) + (1 + r)°(!(j) ¡ t(n));
which immediately implies (29). This argument extends to the case where i
lends and j borrows. If j lends and i borrows we can use the last inequality




(1 + r)°!(i) + ¼M ¡ (1 + r)°((n + 1)c ¡ nt(n))




for ¼M(n) > (1 + r)°[(n + 1)c ¡ nt(n)]. ¥
51Proof of Proposition 7
For the model economy to have a bimodal equilibrium ¯rm size distribution
the formal requirement is that
¹i > ¹j > 0 and ¹l > ¹j with l > j > i > 1: (30)
This implies
¹iW > ¹j and ¹iM > ¹j
¹lW > ¹j and ¹lM > ¹j
Measures ¹nM and ¹nW are determined by cuto® endowments !nW, !nW and
!nM, !nM as de¯ned in Lemma 1. This means there must be su±cient mass
of the endowment distribution within [!iW;!iW] and [!iM;!iM] compared to
[!jW;!jW] and [!jM;!jM]. This means the intervals for i ¯rms must be large
or the endowment distribution must have su±cient mass around the mean due
to negative assortative matching.
For l ¯rms the intervals [!lW;!lW] and [!lM;!lM] have to be su±ciently
large compared to those for j ¯rms as the density function is assumed to
strictly decrease to the right of its mode. This means l ¯rms have to be more
attractive for both owners and workers. This means either jK ¡ lj < jK ¡ jj,
in which case jK ¡ ij > jK ¡ jj and i ¯rms are strictly less e±cient than
j ¯rms, or side payments in l ¯rms must be su±ciently high compared to
smaller ¯rms. This means that owners of l ¯rms have to be su±ciently scarce
compared to smaller ¯rm sizes. Su±cient relative scarcity of owners in l can
only be induced by an endowment distribution that is su±ciently skewed in
the sense that the left tail of the endowment distribution contains su±cient
mass.
In the following we provide explicit conditions on cuto® values necessary
for ¹j < ¹l to hold from which our argumentation can be deduced. Assume
¯rst side payments t(l) and t(j) such that either all workers have to borrow
or both side payments are negative. Then the necessary condition is
¹(!lM · !(i) · !lM) > ¹(!jM · !(i) · !jM):
This inequality only holds if
(!lM ¡ !lM) ¡ (!jM ¡ !jM) (31)
52is su±ciently great. This condition weakens considerably if !jM > !lM, as
the density decreases to the right of the peak. This only happens if workers
have to borrow to pay side payments in both ¯rms, as can be seen by noticing
that workers must be indi®erent between ¯rm sizes, and owning n ¯rms must
involve less investment than owning n0 ¯rms. Hence, high side payments and
su±cient scarcity of owners for zero side payments facilitates the emergence
of large ¯rms. Su±cient scarcity of owners implies su±cient skewness of the
endowment distribution.
Assume now side payments are negative. Then the di®erence (31) increases
in t(l) by the proof of Proposition 4. Therefore (30) implies that side payments
in l ¯rms have to be relatively high in comparison to those in j ¯rms net of
the di®erent levels of pro¯t ¼M(:).






















Then (30) implies that ¹(i : ! · !W) has to be su±ciently large. Noting that








We show now that this is consistent with ¹lM > 0 as the cuto® endowment for











To have l owners it must hold that !M < (l +1)c¡t(l). Combining this with
(32) yields a condition for the existence of both agents preferring to own l
¯rms and agents preferring to work in l ¯rms, that depends on t(j) and the










Note that this condition is required to be su±ciently slack in order to permit a
su±ciently large measure of l ¯rms compared to j ¯rms. This means both the
general level of side payments and relative e±ciency of l ¯rms compared to j
¯rms is required to be su±ciently great. High side payments imply su±cient
skewness of the endowment distribution. This concludes the example. ¥
53B Numerical Examples
Numerical Example for Section 3.5.3
In this subsection we provide the numerical example that generates ¯gure
4. Renegotiation is assumed to be intra-¯rm bargaining (Stole and Zwiebel,
1996) and the payo®s are taken from Gall (2004). In equilibrium, measure
consistency requires that measures of owners equate proportional measures of
workers and, given transfers, there exists no blocking coalition. We restrict our
attention to transfers where ti = t(n) for an owner of an N ¯rm, tj = ¡
t(n)
n
for a worker in an N ¯rm, and t(K) = 0 for all i 2 I for K ¯rm members. A
worker i has no blocking coalition if for all n0 6= n
¼W(n) + (1 + r)(!(i) ¡
t(n)
n
) ¸ ¼W(n0) + (1 + r)(!(i) ¡
t(n0)
n0 ) and
¼W(n) + (1 + r)(!(i) ¡
t(n)
n
¸ ¼1 + (1 + r)!(i) and
¼W(n) + (1 + r)(!(i) ¡
t(n)
n
¸ (1 + r)!(i): (34)
For negative values of wealth net of side payments, the interest rate is given
by (1 + r)°. For owners j it must hold that
¼M(n) + (1 + r)(!(j) + t(n) ¡ (n + 1)c) ¸ ¼M(n0) + (1 + r)(!(j) +
t(n0) ¡ (n0 + 1)c) 8 n0 6= n and
¼M(n) + (1 + r)(!(j) + t(n) ¡ (n + 1)c) ¸ ¼1 + (1 + r)!(j): (35)
Again this expression is for positive net wealth and has to be modi¯ed accord-
ingly if j has to borrow. The set of conditions (34) and (35) combined with
labor and credit market clearing, (9) and (5), provide necessary conditions
that we exploit to ¯nd equilibrium side payment schemes and interest rate by
means of simulation.
The algorithm takes as inputs side payments in n = 2 ¯rms and an interest
rate guess. Then all other side payments are calculated as to make the poorest
agent indi®erent between working in any n > 1 ¯rm. We proceed by clearing
the labor markets associated to each ¯rm size sequentially, starting with the
one with lowest side payments, i.e. the largest ¯rm size. A market n is
cleared by varying side payments in all n0 < n markets such that workers
in those markets remain indi®erent until market n clears. Thereby NAM in
equilibrium (as under part (i) of Proposition 2) can be exploited as clearing
54market n does not a®ect markets n0 > n17. Special attention is required to
the fact that excess demand for labor for a given ¯rm size may be set valued
as agents may be indi®erent between two ¯rm sizes. In this case the measure
of indi®erent agents has to be assigned to both markets associated to the ¯rm
sizes such that the market where side payments are lower possibly clears.
This procedure yields market clearing side payments for all but the smallest
¯rm size and thus an aggregate excess demand for labor for any value of
n = 2 side payments. Repeating this step and varying n = 2 side payments
appropriately approximates the matching equilibrium given an interest rate.
For the credit market to clear this procedure has to be repeated varying the
interest rate appropriately until all conditions in (9) and (5) are satis¯ed.
The parameters of the simulation of a drop of capital on the economy are












where G is de¯ned such that
R !
! f(x) = 1 given all other parameters. The
endowment increase corresponds to a parameter change reported in Table 1.
Parameters before after Results before after
c 0.1500 0.1500 mean endowment 0.1479 0.1498
° 3.0000 3.0000 r 0.1900 0.1715
! 0.0000 0.0125 n = 1 ¯rms 0.0826 0.0701
! 1.0000 1.0125 n = 2 ¯rms 0.0673 0.0618
¯ 1.9000 1.3000 K = 3 ¯rms 0.0546 0.0439
¸ 10.4500 13.0000 n = 4 ¯rms 0.0284 0.0271
g 2.9000 2.2000 n = 5 ¯rms 0.0432 0.0603
l 3.6000 2.5000 mean output 0.4216 0.4204
Table 1: Simulation Details for Figure 4
The production function depending on the number of workers in a ¯rm, n,





17This is the reason why admitting partial ownership generates certain di±culties for
numerical simulation. Typically, clearing markets sequentially causes circles as owners of
asset II tend to sit in the middle of the endowment distribution. This leaves a nonlinear
system of equations in excess demand correspondences which can be quite tedious to solve.
55with h = 0:90 and K = 3. Cost of an asset is c = 0:1500 and the degree of
credit market imperfection is ° = 3:00. Then we obtain the results in Table 1.
Numerical Example for Section 3.6
In order to provide some evidence of robustness of our ¯ndings to Assumption
2, we conduct a numerical example that generates ¯gure 5. Renegotiation is
again assumed to be intra-¯rm bargaining (Stole and Zwiebel, 1996) and the
payo®s are taken from Gall (2004). However, we replace Assumption 2 by the
following assumption on technology




2 . Joint ownership is not feasible.
Thus we can limit our attention to n < 4 productive coalition yet admitting
for all ownership constellations except for joint ownership. Table 2 lists the
possible combinations of ownership rights:







Table 2: Ownership Structures
Coalitions of type F will not emerge in equilibrium as they are dominated
by type A coalitions under our assumptions. To see this let side payments
in an F coalition be denoted by tW(F) for the workers' payments and tO(F)
for the payments of the owner of two assets AII, henceforth denoted by O.
Note ¯rst that in order to have both workers and managers in F coalitions,
the following condition on side payments, derived analogously to Proposition




























Combining (36) and (37), a necessary condition for workers, managers, and













Finally, we must have that in equilibrium some agents prefer to be workers in







Plugging this into (38) and some algebra yield a simple necessary condition







As this condition is violated by Assumption 5, type F coalitions are not part
of an equilibrium. Moreover, it can be shown that investments for managers
and owners in type C and E coalitions must be identical, as their payo®s
in the renegotiation game are identical. This leaves us with a vector of four
side payments (tW(B);tW(C);tW(D);tW(E)) that need to support the labor
market equilibrium. This allows us to use the above simulation approach.
We use the same endowment distribution as in the case above. The pro-
duction function depending on the number of workers, n, is assumed to be
f(n) = (hnh)
0:6 :
with h = 1:25 implying K = 2. Cost of an asset is c = 0:3000 and the degree
of credit market imperfection is ° = 3:00. The results are reported in Table 3.
Coalition Type A B C D E unempl.
Measure 0.0135 0.0328 0.0139 0.0580 0.0000 0.6009
Table 3: Simulation Results for Figure 5
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